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Introduction 
The hierarchical structure of corporate governance denies workers basic 
democratic rights that are guaranteed in the political sector. These rights, which include 
freedom, equality and governmental participation are often absent in the workplace. 
Workers cannot speak freely, feel equal or actively participate in governance in a 
workplace where people are seen as anonymous parts of a corporate machine rather than 
as individuals. 
The inconsistency between democracy and workplace rights is harmful to both 
the laborer and to society. Can a person feel autonomous if he or she is denied rights in 
one sphere and provided with them in another? In order for people to feel truly valued, 
the democratic ideals of freedom and equality and the right to vote should be present in 
both the civic and work domains. In this thesis I argue that democratic ideals can apply 
to multiple social spheres. Based on this argument, I explore the role of democratic 
ideals· in the workplace and how the position of the worker can be improved through 
expanded democratic participation. When worker participation in a business is combined 
with alternative leadership models many problems in the workplace can be solved. 
At first glance, democratic rights appear to exist in the workplace because of laws 
that protect the worker. There are restrictions on workplace discrimination by gender, 
race, ethnicity, age and in some states, sexual orientation. People are free to leave a job if 
they are unhappy with it and mental or physical abuse of any kind is illegal. However, 
systems oflaws and regulations create an impression of democratic freedom and equality 
without actually offering the worker democratic control in the workplace. 
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Protective rights, such as those mentioned above, are often found in the workplace 
while rights to autonomy are absent. In the political arena where individuals are valued 
as rational beings, the right to autonomy is guaranteed. For example, in a democratic 
society, the citizen has the right to elect someone to represent their interests. This right 
recognizes the citizen as a rational and self-sufficient being who can and should 
contribute to the larger community. In the workplace, managers and bosses are often 
hired by the company and though they are meant to help and represent the worker, they 
are not truly accountable to them in any way. Democratic societies also guarantee 
freedom of speech and equal representation under the law. In a corporate finn, there are 
often restrictions on what a person can say, who they can talk to and the influence they 
can have on the workplace. Workers are regularly denied rights that the government 
guarantees in other sectors. 
This thesis explores workplace rights with the intent of increasing democratic 
participation and in turn, equality and voice for the worker. Equality for the worker does 
not merely mean a right to protection, nor does it mean removal of a power structure. In 
the case of worker participation, equality indicates that a person is free to say what he or 
she thinks about the organization. Equality also suggests that each worker will be valued 
as a rational human being with a right to participate. Such equality cannot exist only in 
the structure of the firm but must also be reinforced by the culture of the organization in 
order to promote open discussion and collective decision-making. 
The right to voice is also inherent in democratic principles, but as this thesis 
suggests, voice alone is not enough to guarantee equality within the workplace. Even 
when employees in a traditional firm are given more freedom to voice opinions and make 
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suggestions to the company, they are not given active rights or power. Though their 
voice may be heard, they have no direct power or control over their workplace. Voice 
without power does not promote equality. In order to create a culture of equality, all 
workers must not only have equal voice, but also equal choice within the firm. Worker-
ownership guarantees that workers will be able to act on their opinions and make choices 
for the organization. Unlike a traditional firm, worker-owned businesses offer freedom 
of choice combined with control, which creates an environment where a worker can feel 
autonomous and secure. 
It is the intent of this thesis to explore alternatives to the current methods of 
corporate governance and to examine business models that apply democratic ideals in the 
economic sector. Specifically I address one normative and three empirical questions. 
First, why should democratic principles and ideals be a part of the economic sector? 
After addressing this normative question by presenting several theoretical responses, I 
address three practical questions related to worker-participation: Is it possible for 
democratic and alternative businesses to function successfully in the capitalist market? 
What would a democratically organized finn look like to the common laborer? What 
type ofleadership structure would exist in a democratically driven firm? 
I approach these questions from several perspectives throughout the thesis. The 
foundation of this thesis is structured upon the first question: why should democratic 
ideals be brought to the economic sector? I consider this question in the first chapter in 
which I outline several current problems in the workplace. These recurring social 
problems can be broken down into three categories: contract issues, psychological 
devaluation and coercive leadership. Additionally, each issue has social implications 
such as distrust of governing bodies, loss of human dignity and one way dependency on 
providers. 
Several economic and social theories suggest that worker participation in 
corporate governance provides a solution to these problems. The theorists. Robert Dahl, 
Gregory Dow and John Stuart Mill, endorse the use of democratic processes in the 
economic sector because they believe it will improve both the personal position of the 
laborer and the community as a whole. Based on these theories I argue that it is right to 
apply democratic ideals in the economic sector. It is this possibility that leads to the 
second question: what does a democratic firm look like from the perspective of the 
worker? 
I explore the position of the laborer in democratically driven firms in the second 
chapter. This chapter provides a literature review of historical and modern alternative 
business models both in the United States and internationally. This chapter presents 
examples of alternative businesses that are both socially and economically possible 
despite their lack of a traditional corporate structure. Businesses examined include the 
Mondragon Cooperative in Spain and the Plywood Cooperatives of the United States. 
The research explores the daily role of the laborer within the company, the general 
structure of the organization and the economic viability of the company within a 
capitalist market. 
In addition I conduct a case study on an American alternative business. The 
company, Weaver Street Market (WSM), is located in Carrboro, North Carolina and 
follows a cooperative ownership plan in which members have an equal vote in the 
decision,.making processes of the company. I chose this business because of its location 
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and the business sector that it represents. The cooperative is also part of a mainstream 
market, the grocery industry, which is accessed by people in every community. WSM 
has also been active for almost twenty years and is therefore stable and established within 
its market. 
The case study, discussed in chapters three and four, explores the extent to which 
this company provides the laborer with democratic rights in the workplace. The study 
evaluates working conditions, employee input into business decisions, managerial 
structure, profit-sharing and various other elements. I also examine whether WSM 
displays the typical strengths and weaknesses found in alternative business models and 
how they address those issues. The information in the case study is both qualitative and 
quantitative. It is based on visits to the company's headquarters as well as in depth 
analysis of worker feedback data collected by the National Center for Employee 
Ownership in Oakland, CA. Other supplemental data and corporate statistics are 
included. 
In the third chapter I combine leadership theory with the practices at WSM to 
answer the question: What does leadership in a non-traditional firm look like? Most 
traditional companies function within a hierarchical leadership structure that is non-
negotiable. Concepts of success in the workplace are often based on promotions, status 
and achieving a higher rank in the pecking order. 
Such hierarchical leadership structures are detrimental to expressing the intrinsic 
worth of each laborer in the firm. The pecking order of a firm not only gives more 
responsibility to certain individuals, but also suggests that those individuals are more 
important, or more valuable to the firm than others. Because this structure is not 
congruent with the basic democratic ideals of equality and liberty, another system should 
be devised. 
Removing leadership completely and reducing the firm to total anarchy is out of 
the question because the company will not be able to function without some defined 
structure. The third chapter offers alternatives to this hierarchical system that are 
cohesive with democratic business models. For example, some firms allow the laborers 
to elect their managers while others offer managerial positions on a rotational basis. In 
this chapter I will explore a variety of options for leadership in these firms and will also 
offer my judgment on which structure is the most viable. 
Because leadership structures are a prominent part of this thesis I discuss the past 
and current leadership structures that the organization has used. Is leadership in the firm 
hierarchical? Are managers held responsible by employees? Why were these methods 
chosen and are they successful? These questions will give me practical insight into the 
success of a variety of leadership models. 
Beyond discussions of company philosophy and management, I discuss the 
economics of the organization and particularly what affect, if any, worker ownership has 
on the monetary success of the business. Because the goal of most corporations is to 
make money, worker participation must at least offer the same level of production as a 
hierarchical company to be considered viable. 
After meeting with management-level employees, I gathered information about 
the organization from local news sources, cooperative publications and the WSM 
monthly newspaper. I used this information to gamer an understanding of the image that 
Weaver Street is trying to present to the community and to its owners. 
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Because I could not get access or permission to interview individual employees, I 
used survey data collected by the national Center for Employee Ownership to understand 
the worker's perspective at Weaver Street. The survey was composed of 75 scale-based 
items in which employees ranked their feelings about different aspects of the 
organization. Questions covered topics such as feelings about ownership, satisfaction in 
the workplace, feelings about leadership and management and willingness to contribute 
to the long-term goals of the organization. I use this data to analyze the success of the 
cooperative model at Weaver Street and to draw comparisons to the larger world of 
worker-ownership. 
As I approach the issues of \Vorker-participation from several different 
perspectives, I hope to gain insight into the possibility of worker participation in 
corporate firms. I want to not only explore the day to day functions of these companies 
but also to explore how their practices may become more widespread in the American 
business sector. A key element in the functionality of these alternative businesses is the 
role of leadership within the corporation. 
In the past ten years, research and exploration of alternative business models has 
increased significantly in the areas of Employee Stock Ownership Plans and 
Cooperatives. It is my hope that this thesis will present new insights to this ongoing 
research specifically in the field of leadership. Because the success or failure of a 
company can depend on how it is run and who is in charge, finding a viable yet 
democratic leadership method will be essential to furthering worker ownership in 
America. 
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Chapter 1 
Why combine democracy and economics? 
Democratic principles must be brought to the workplace in order to improve the 
position of the laborer within the economic sector. These rights should take the form of 
worker management, ownership and cooperation in the decision making processes of the 
firm. But why ought this change occur? Why bring these rights or this kind of 
responsibility to the ordinary worker? Should work be structured democratically? 
Work 
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Work within a hierarchical system is problematic because it creates a dependency 
on other people, a community of distrust and a loss of human dignity (Karasek and 
Theorell, 1990). Each of these problems affects the laborer not only in the workplace, 
but also at home and in the community. In this section I will outline the failings of the 
corporate hierarchical system with regard to contractual agreements, coercive leadership 
and psychological devaluation. 
One of the earliest and arguably most unjust forms oflabor was the practice of 
slavery. In her book "The Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal of Modern Work," 
Joanne Ciulla quotes Aristotle as saying, ''Slaves ... have no share in happiness because 
they have no control over their lives, which consist mostly of work, punishment, and 
food" (2000, p.75) The injustice of this system was later realized on several levels, all of 
which pertain to the contemporary work environment. Slavery was unethical because 
people were not treated as equals, they were not valued as free-thinking individuals and 
they were forced to labor without consent. 
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With the hope of avoiding similar injustices in the modem world, labor contracts 
were created. These contracts give people the right to sell their ability to work to an 
employer. The contracts are also meant to guarantee the laborer basic democratic rights in 
the workplace. The worker can now choose his place of work and by signing a contract, 
he consents to the conditions of that workplace. However, what if the conditions of the 
work place are abominable and democratic rights are denied? Can the employer defend 
himself by arguing that the worker consented to the conditions? 
By agreeing to work at a specific company, the laborer acknowledges that he or 
she will be giving up some personal freedoms while at work (Ciulla, 2000). Businesses 
would not run efficiently if all employees pursued their own self-interest with complete 
disregard for the organization. Ciulla argues that "in theory it is not wrong to take away a 
person's freedom as long as he or she consents to the arrangement" (2000, p.83). But that 
is in theory; in practice a hardworking individual may suffer because he was forced to 
consent to an employer's damaging contract. 
In most situations the worker is not physically forced by another person or by a 
specific company to consent to a contract, rather he is forced by his social status and need 
to survive. Democratically, the laborer is allowed to make choices for himself but "when 
the only options are accepting or quitting, consent doesn't really exist" (Muirhead, 2004, 
p.74). The argument is often made that if people are unhappy with the conditions of the 
workplace, they can just leave. Changing jobs can't be that difficult. However, if the 
laborer is a life-long miner living in a small town with only one mine, he has no exit; 
thus, the argument fails. 
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When a laborer cannot willingly leave his workplace and survive, the 
· environment becomes similar to that of slave and master. The laborer is completely 
dependent on his employer. From this, the employer gains unwarranted authoritative 
power over his laborers, because they must obey, or be out of a job and income 
(Muirhead, 2004). Therefore, desperate to live, the worker places himself in a rigid work 
environment where he has no control over his life. Workers in this situation have been 
returned to the exact working conditions that contracts were meant to avoid. 
It is this master-slave mentality that often leads to abuses of power by leaders and 
the subsequent psychological devaluation of the laborer. These two negative aspects of 
work are cyclical; the leader puts down the worker which makes him feel devalued and 
this in tum gives the leader even more power. In the following argument I do not mean 
to suggest that every laborer in the country is unhappy or feels devalued. On the 
contrary, many workers are content with their jobs and find pleasure in their day to day 
activities. However, many laborers are psychologically affected by their work. These 
people often divide their lives into two separate and unrelated sectors; a process which 
allows them to remain content and make sense of their contradictory roles (Sennett & 
Cobb, 1972). 
Personal devaluation and questions of worth arise from two specific issues in the 
workplace: hierarchy and a lack of trust. Feelings of worthlessness are reinforced by the 
authoritative power given to managers or foremen in corporate systems. This master-like 
figure makes the laborer question his own ability to speak up or fight back. Self-doubt is 
ingrained in him because he does not know whether acting outside of his specific role 
will cost him his job (Sennett & Cobb, 1972). The self-doubt and questioning that occurs 
at work is what leads to a psychological division of personality and a loss of dignity in 
the civil sector. 
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Corporate hierarchies are damaging because of the class structure that they create 
within communities. Though hierarchies can be seen as a way to add organization, 
control and structure to a firm traditional hierarchies often become a negative power 
structure for decision making within the firm. This power structure is what can greatly 
limit freedom and equality for the worker because it limits who has a voice. Inherently a 
hierarchical structure suggests that some people are more valuable than others. The 
managers and bosses of an organization are in charge of the laborers and therefore wield 
more power and view themselves as the more valuable human being. A stonemason 
interviewed by Studs Terkel is aware of his social class merely by the label people give 
him; "I think a laborer feels that he's the low man. Not so much that he works with his 
hands, it's that he's at the bottom of the scale ... The main thing is the common laborer -
even the word common laborer- just sounds so common, he's at the bottom'' (Terkel, 
1972, p. 18). 
Workers begin to see themselves as two different people, the "common" laborer 
with little to no self-expression, and the father/husband/friend who instills discipline, 
leads his family and supports people who need him. In order to keep some sense of 
autonomy the laborer must separate who the job makes him and who he really is (Sennett 
& Cobb, 1972). One man who felt powerless at work expressed his true identity by 
buying a large car that he couldn't really afford. He defended his purchase by saying that 
he bought it "because you can really move in it, you got plenty of power. In that little car 
of yours [the interviewer's Volkswagen station wagon], you got no control, you gonna 
get pushed around on the road" (Terkel, 1972, p.164 ). 
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Laborers do not like feeling completely dependent on others; the need for 
personal power and a sense of control is what makes self-employment the common goal 
of many factory workers (Terkel, 1972). A steelworker stated "I would rather work my 
ass off for eight hours a day with nobody watching me than five minutes with a guy 
watching me" (p.2). Many laborers say that they continue working in these hierarchical 
companies to provide a better life for their children who they hope will become doctors 
and lawyers (Sennett & Cobb, 1972). The other aspect of self-employment that is 
alluring is a sense of safety and trust, elements that are missing from the large corporate 
system. 
A lack of loyalty and trust in an organization adds to feelings of worthlessness 
and leaves a worker constantly uncertain about the future. "When employees sense or 
know that the company will drop them in a heartbeat just to stay competitive, loyalty is 
absurd. Loyalty is a reciprocal concept" (Ciulla, 2000, p.153). The laborer \vho harbors 
distrust has no desire to work harder or commit to the common goals of a company. This 
lack of loyalty is also harmful to the corporation because it means that the employees 
may not be engaged or working to their maximum ability. 
Working in constant fear of job loss can have negative psychological and physical 
ramifications for the laborer. Often, laborers who distrust the company will work longer 
hours because they expect to be fired at any moment. Workers at a Pittsburgh car 
manufacturing plant started working twelve hour days, seven days a week, when other 
local plants laid people off (Yates, 2003). It is this collective fear on the part of the 
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worker that once again empowers the employer. Many employers find that is cheaper to 
have current employees work overtime than it is to hire new laborers. Not only does the 
employer have to pay the current laborer half as much, but he also avoids training new 
people for the job. The leaders in these corporations are taking advantage of the workers' 
fear in order to save money. 
When a laborer signs a contract to work for a specific company, he is consenting 
to the rules and regulations of that organization. Sometimes, the system works well and 
the laborer is content in doing his job. All too often, however, one or more of the above 
problems arises in the workplace. The laborer may find himself in an unsatisfactory 
company with no exit strategy, he may be coerced by his employer into working long 
hours or completing questionable tasks and he may suffer psychologically from the lack 
of control he has over his working life. These work related issues habituate the laborer to 
distrust corporations, to accept a loss of dignity and to depend on others for survival. 
Trends of distrust, loss of dignity and dependency are cited by social theorists 
who argue that the workplace can and must be changed. Robert A. Dahl, Gregory Dow 
and John Stuart Mill each argue that the position of the laborer is a problem and that 
worker-participation in firm governance is the solution. Each theorist refers to at least 
one of the work related problems I have just mentioned. Dahl discusses "binding" 
corporate contracts as they relate to democratic governmental contracts, while Dow uses 
the worker's loss of human dignity to argue for an improved corporate structure. Finally, 
Mill refers to human dignity as well as dependency to explain how the advancement of 
society relies on greater worker participation. 
14 
Arguments for \Vorkcr Participation 
Dahl, Dow and Mill each offers a distinct perspective on why political democracy 
regulates democracy at work. Dahl offers a case for autonomy which states that if a 
society guarantees certain freedoms and rights in the governmental sector, it must also 
guarantee these rights in the economic sector. He argues that autonomy must be found 
between the two systems; otherwise, neither system is valid. Dow bases his argument on 
the prospect of improving human dignity. He claims that the current corporate structure 
reduces the value of human beings and can damage an individual's self-esteem. Dow 
believes that a new corporate structure needs to be developed on the basis of treating each 
individual in the company with equality and respect. The final theorist, Mill, argues that 
the current corporate structure creates a protectorate in which a dual-caste system 
separates people and does not give them equal social rights. In order for people to be 
treated as equals, there has to be a system where they can be independent of other classes. 
Mill wants to dissolve this structure so that more people can contribute to the 
advancement of society. 
The first argument, as presented by Dahl in his book "A Preface to Economic 
Democracy," is that there must be a sense of autonomy between the democratic rule of 
the state and rule within the economic sector. "ff democracy is justified in governing the 
state, then it must also be justified in governing economic enterprises; and to say that itis 
not justified in governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in 
governing the state" (Dahl, 1985, p.111 ). Accepting this first conditional statement as 
true, Dahl continues to explain certain "assumptions" about democracies which translate 
into the economic realm. 
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Democracy, by definition, provides the inalienable right for people to govern 
themselves and to make decisions about matters that affect them directly. Within the 
governing body some decisions must be made collectively that will be binding on all 
members of the group. These decisions, however, should be made only by people who 
will be subject to that rule. The democratic system is also thought to be consistent with 
equality and liberty. Equality, in general terms, refers to the moral worth of each adult 
member of the collective and acknowledges that persons' right to have a share in decision 
making. The second factor, liberty, is the ability for each person in the system to be the 
judge of his or her own interests. It is also the right of these people to expect certain 
amounts ofliberty without having to defend or explain it. The final assumption made 
about a democratic system is that there should be some practice of fairness which 
recognizes the needs of each individual in the group (Dahl, 1985). 
Having presented this argument Dahl clarifies that it does not apply to every 
association everywhere. For instance, in specific secret societies such as the Freemasons 
or Knights Templar, members do not expect unlimited freedom and liberty because they 
have taken an oath which prevents them from having full use of these rights. Therefore, 
the assumptions about democracy do not apply to these organizations because the 
aforementioned rights are not expected by the members. 
Dahl demonstrates the similarities between work and the government by applying 
the idea of "binding" decision-making, or contractual agreements, to the corporate 
system. "Like the government of the state, the government of the firm makes decisions 
that apply uniformly to all workers or a category of workers ... " (Dahl, 1985, p.113 ). The 
decisions of the firm, like those of the government, are binding and can be enforced with 
punishment or firing. 
The government enforces binding decisions on its citizenry by placing people in 
jail, requiring community service or levying fines. In the business world a person is 
punished by demotion, extra working hours or firing; these corporate decisions are also 
binding on the laborer because of contracts. To support his belief, Dahl addresses the 
same issues of exit from a corporation that were discussed previously. If people are 
unhappy with a local government or even a national government they can move or 
establish citizenship elsewhere. However, "is not 'exit' ( or exile) often so costly, in 
every sense, that membership is for all practical purposes compulsory ... " (Dahl, 1985, 
p.114). People could choose to leave their jobs or work elsewhere, but what if there are 
no jobs to be had? There is no requirement as in the governmental sector that they 
become citizens of another place. If a job is lost or left, there is no guaranteed other 
option. 
The first assumption about democracy has thus been met in the economic sector: 
decisions made by the governing body are binding on the governed. Therefore, by 
democratic principle, the governed should have some input into the policies of the 
governing body. But what should that input be, and who should get to have a say? 
Dahl argues that the democratic principle of equality means that all employees 
should have a say and should get to decide what issues they vote upon and what is left to 
management. "Except in exceedingly small firms, employees would surely choose to 
delegate some decisions to managers. In larger firms they would no doubt elect a 
governing board or council. .. " (Dahl, 1985, p.118). In sum, employees are qualified to 
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make decisions about how the firm is run because all individuals are inherently equal and 
have the ability to reason and make decisions. 
Gregory Dow disagrees with Dahl's argument that the right of employees to 
govern a firm is inalienable, because not all people may want to work in a democratic 
firm. Instead he argues for worker control on the basis of human dignity and freedom of 
choice. Dow (2003) believes that workers should be free to choose employee governance 
if no other important social need would be sacrificed. For example, freedom of choice 
should not be given to the laborer if it will remove his ability to work in a physically safe 
environment or if it will decrease his apparent value as human being. 
Dow believes that the employee collective should be given several choices of how 
to run the company at its outset. The laborers should be offered two or more choices, 
otherwise the process itself is undemocratic. Because the decisions of a firm will affect 
local goods, employee wages, working conditions, rules and social atmosphere, the 
employees deserve to have some say in the decisions of the firm. 
Dow argues that as it stands now, the capacity of labor is bought and sold similar 
to any other commodity on the market. Though contracts and consensual agreements 
attempt to avoid an unjust system, he believes that the slave mentality still exists. Dow 
argues that the idea that labor is a commodity that has been in existence since Biblical 
times, but was truly advanced during British colonial rule. People were bought and sold 
as assets to be used in labor markets. Since the Enlightenment, this concept has been 
considered inhumane, particularly by democratic countries. Democracy resolves that 
people should be treated equally and that they have some intrinsic worth. Therefore labor 
is not like other commodities because it takes the human form; the form of an inherently 
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reasonable being who can make decisions. The fact that humans are indirectly bought 
and sold like other commodities is an affront to their dignity. In worker-managed firms, 
the individuals would have some control over labor processes and would establish an 
intrinsic value higher than that of other commodities (Dow, 2003). 
Human dignity in the current corporate system is also compromised by the 
"unidirectional" relationships between the superior and the worker. This relationship is a 
product of the corporate hierarchies that exist in many factories and other top-down 
businesses. Dow refers to this relationship as potentially damaging to the laborer 
especially when the system is abused. Because the superior is not accountable to his 
employees he can talk down to them, control their daily lives and give the impression that 
he is of a higher social status. Dow agrees with two theorists, Samuel Bowles and 
Herbert Gintis, who state that people should be treated equally in the workplace and 
should not be separated by a caste-like system. The current hierarchy of many businesses 
places people into the status based categories (Dow, 2003). A worker-managed firm 
would require that superiors be accountable to laborers and would also create a system 
where management was viewed as a necessity for success instead of a dominating chain 
of command. 
Dow (2003) contends that the social separation of this system also affects 
community relationships and self-respect among laborers. As shown in the discussion of 
work, people are psychologically affected by the environment in which they labor. Often 
the effect takes the form of personal devaluation. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs places 
Esteem in the top five things that humans need to be fulfilled (Maslow, 1943). The 
Esteem need is not often met in a system where the laborer does not feel he meets the 
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standards of the community, whether it be at work or at home. In a worker-managed firm 
the laborers create the community and can therefore meet the standards that have been set 
by themselves and their peers. This allows the individual to meet his or her esteem needs 
as well as meeting several higher level self-actualization needs. 
Dow's central argument is that corporate structures are an affront to human 
dignity. People, human beings, are at the center of this debate, and it is their welfare and 
equality that is at stake. The hierarchical and caste-like labor construction teaches people 
that it is acceptable to value some people more than others. If we believe in advancing 
the democratic ideal of inherent human equality, the current corporate structure is 
slowing our progress. 
John Stuart Mill argues that a separation between governmental rights and 
economic rights can lead to bad citizens. He believes that autonomy in one sector must 
link to autonomy in other sectors in order for citizens to feel secure and prosper. As 
argued in the previous section, workers do not always feel secure in their places of 
employment and this has a variety of side-effects. "Person and property cannot be 
considered secure where the administration of justice is imperfect..." (Mill, 1965, p.533). 
Mill claims that the current systems do not align because of the historically dual division 
of the employer and employee relationship which leads to unnecessary dependence and 
social stratification. Because the laborer may have no exit strategy and because he often 
lacks the esteem to speak up and challenge the decision making process, he is completely 
at the will of his employer; his daily life depends on that person's decisions. 
Historically, the justification for elite rule has been the idea of a "protectorate" 
where those with power and money support and provide for the laboring classes. The 
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system worked when there were actually things from which people needed protection. 
For example, in the period of the Roman Empire, laborers had no way to protect 
themselves from invading war lords such as Genghis Kahn. In response to this, property 
owning nobles raised an anny to fight off invaders. In still earlier eras, wild animals and 
weather were a threat and so the employer provided laborers with shelter and safety. The 
upper class protected their workers from the enemy and therefore insured the dependence 
of the laborer on his employer. 
Mill argues, however, that technological advances and the growth of modern 
society have lessoned the amount of protection people truly need. Because of 
governmental support, individual rights, and beliefs in equality and hard work, people 
can now function individually in society. Every man, including the laborer, has the 
capacity to take care of himself, but more importantly, he has the capacity to reason 
(Mill, 1965). According to Mill, the dual caste system is not only outdated, but it also not 
cohesive with popular democratic ideals. 
The influx of information that was present during the industrial revolution, Mill's 
era, has increased immensely today. Mill believed that the ability for the layman to 
access information is what would make him an independent and educated contributor to 
society. By providing education and information to the laboring classes, these people 
will become independent of the "employer" class. "The aim of improvement should be 
not solely to place human beings in a condition in which they will be able to do without 
one another, but to enable them to work with or for one another in relations not involving 
dependence" (Mill, 1965, p. 763). Mill argues that this independence should take the 
form of equality in business; specifically joint ownership and valued input by the laborer. 
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Using several examples of then current partnerships and cooperatives Mill 
explains why the involvement of the laborer is the best thing for society. New 
experiences and responsibilities "raise the character" of the laborer "making him a more 
valuable citizen" (Mill, 1965, p.765). Not only is the laborer now more valuable to 
society, but he is also more valuable to the company because he has some ownership in it 
and has a reason to work hard and strive to profit. In sum, Mill believes that the greater 
good would benefit from the "conversion of each human being's daily occupation into a 
school of the social sympathies and the practical intelligence" (p.790). 
Mill's argument, though an advance in the value and position of the laborer, is 
more of an attempt to overhaul and improve the entire social structure. Mill's main 
reason for making the worker less dependent on his employer is to improve the quality of 
how he lives. Less dependence on others means that the laboring classes will have to 
become more educated and will contribute more to the governing of society. 
Each of the above theorists offers a valid and defensible argument for the 
implementation of democratic ideals in the economic sector. I do not wish to choose one 
theory as the "right" reason for creating alternative businesses. However, based on the 
problems with work and the proposed solution of worker participation, there are portions 
of each argument that I find more relevant than others. 
The arguments for human dignity and the dissolution of a protectorate system are 
the most valuable to establishing a just system ofleadership in the business sector. Not 
only do these theories embrace the democratic ideals presented by Dahl's argument, but 
they also establish a precedent for valuing each individual involved in the firm. The 
laborers discussed in the first section have high esteem needs and if a corporation could 
show that they did indeed value their laborers, the individual person would benefit 
greatly. If alternative businesses focused their day to day practices on a philosophy of 
value and inclusion, they would build the foundation for a democratically inclined 
organization. 
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From this foundation, the leadership style most applicable to the company would 
emerge. The laborers would most likely have a say in the leadership style of the 
company which automatically provides the leader with the necessary legitimacy to 
acquire follower support. Because of this legitimacy, followers would be less self-
interested and are more likely to work for the company as a whole. The lack of a rigid 
and untouchable hierarchical system could also decrease feelings of inferiority among 
workers and would better satisfy individual esteem needs. Each of these improvements 
stems from the company's general acceptance of the intrinsic worth of the laborer and his 
or her ability to participate in the company. 
Bringing democratic ideals such as equality and liberty to the economic sector is 
possible. As argued by Dahl, Dow and Mill, it is also ethically and socially justifiable. 
However, can a company be economically successful without the traditional hierarchical 
leadership structure? Theorists such as Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972) argue 
that a hierarchical structure is necessary within a firm to prevent "shirking" by 
employees. They argue that team-based structures cannot efficiently measure the input of 
each employee and therefore production may fall. A "monitor" is needed to observe and 
measure the individual inputs of each employee in order to guarantee economic success 
for the company. 
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Gary Yukl (2006) identifies other potential weaknesses of a participatory system 
in his book Leadership in Organizations. He argues that worker participation is not 
practical in some organizations because the decisions of a company are not made in one 
moment. Rather, decisions occur over a period of time with a variety of meetings and 
discussions. He states that because of this structure there is no way for every employee 
to complete his daily work and to be involved in this process. 
Due to objections like these, worker-participation will not be considered a viable 
business model unless it is shown to function as successfully as hierarchical corporations. 
Despite the aforementioned doubts, the information presented in the follo\ving chapters 
will show that non-traditional firms can indeed be successful in the capitalist market. In 
the upcoming chapters I explore three organizations with regard to the previously posed 
research questions: Can participatory businesses function in the capitalist market? If they 
are successful, how can you measure that success both economically and democratically? 
What is the leadership structure of each organization and how does it contribute to the 
success of the firm? 
The first two organizations I address are the Mondragon Cooperative in Spain and 
Plywood Cooperatives of the Western United States. The study of these two 
organizations demonstrates the possible economic success and growth of cooperative 
organizations in two markets. In the third and fourth chapters I explore the 
aforementioned research questions in more depth with regards to the Weaver Street 
Market Cooperative. 
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Chapter 2 
The Functionality of Worker Ownership 
Theoretically, worker participation is a solution to multiple problems in the 
workplace. However, relatively few worker-owned firms exist within the capitalist 
market. If worker participation would in fact substantially improve the role of the worker 
then why are so few companies turning over power to the employee? Several answers 
can be found in general criticisms of worker-ownership which contends that cooperative 
businesses cannot be successful in the capitalist market due to "shirking" by employees; a 
lack of capital, struggles with growth and the overall risk involved. 
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz criticize cooperative and team environments 
because they encourage shirking. According to the authors, shirking, or not doing your 
job well, often occurs in teams because they fail to motivate the individual. In a 
cooperative organization people are continually working together and are not being 
rewarded for going above and beyond as individuals. The authors suggest that because 
the individual is not monitored separately from the group, he will shirk his duties and will 
not contribute as much to the overall work of the organization. "But since costs must be 
incurred to monitor each other, each input owner will have more incentive to shirk when 
he works as part of a team, than if his performance could be monitored easily or ifhe did 
not work as a team"(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972, p.780). 
In addition to the problems of shirking in cooperative or team oriented 
environments, there is also no way to fire or release the inadequate employees. In a 
traditional firm the management has control over the shirking employees and can release 
them if they are not aiding the success of the organization as a whole. In cooperative 
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firms, release occurs only in extreme circumstances; thus the company can be hindered 
by shirking employees. Therefore, cooperative businesses cannot be as successful 
because they will produce less and the employees will not work as hard as employees in a 
conventionally monitored setting(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
Failure to gain capital is also cited as a reason that worker coops cannot succeed 
for long periods of time. The cooperative is limited in how much capital it can obtain 
because all capital comes from the employees. Unlike a traditional corporation that sells 
stock to anyone on the public market, cooperatives can only sell as many stocks as they 
have jobs available. There is no option to auction off shares to the highest bidder or to 
rely on share values to increase corporate profits. The goal of selling employee shares in 
a cooperative is about garnering a commitment from the worker, not about raising 
revenue. 
Cooperative shares can also be cheaper than those of a conventional firm because 
the cooperative wants to make ownership available to potential employees. If an 
employee cannot buy into the system, there is no reason for the cooperative to exist. On 
occasion cooperatives will seek bank loans or government assistance in order to finance 
specific projects. This becomes difficult though when the cooperative has to provide 
collateral to their financers. Because there is no direct share to offer donors, finding 
tangible collateral is a problem. However, because accepting outside capital is counter-
intuitive to the mission of the organization, many cooperatives struggle with debt as they 
attempt to gain enough money to successfully function (Pencavel, 200 I). 
Financial growth of the firm in the capitalist market is one of the main goals of 
most businesses. In "10 percent of the Fortune 500 corporations, growth was a 
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prevailing value in every document and far exceeded all other values in both mention and 
emphasis"(Cheney & Frenette, 1993). Growth suggests competition and success as well 
as a desire to change and adapt to the pressures of the current times. Growth within many 
traditional firms means an increase in the profits of owners. In a cooperative, this 
increase cannot be measured because income is divided throughout the organization. 
Because of this distinction, there is 1ess chance of growth in a cooperative fim1. T11is 
limitation exists in a cooperative because extreme growth is counter-intuitive to the 
workplace democracy. Worker participation is more direct and more successful in small, 
tight-knit firms. 
Despite these challenges and criticisms of cooperative development. two 
organizations in particular have succeeded in the capitalist market while following a 
cooperative business plan. The Mondragon Cooperative in Spain and the Plywood 
Cooperatives of the Pacific Northwest have survived and prospered in the capitalist 
market for more than fifty years. These organizations have shown that despite 
differences in industry, organizational structure and location, cooperative businesses can 
be successful in the current economic system. 
Mondragon 
The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (Mondragon, MCC) is one of the oldest 
and largest cooperative business organizations in the world. Mondragon is made up of 
over 150 individual businesses in the Basque region of Spain. The organization began in 
the 1950s when a Catholic priest, Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta, attempted to revive the 
local economy by starting new businesses in the town of Mondragon (Clark, 2004). 
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The priest and several technically educated craftsmen started a business producing 
petrol heaters and developed a management model based on Catholic social values 
(Martinez, 2000). They called this model the "third way" because it was an alternative to 
extreme capitalism and something similar to communism (Cheney, 1999). The first 
cooperative touted "Open Admission; Democratic Organization; Sovereignty of Labor; 
Subordinate Nature of Capital; Participatory Management; Payment Solidarity; Inter-
cooperation; Social Transformation; Universality; and Education" (Clark, 2004 ). Sixty 
years later, these values are still the root of everything that Mondragon works for as an 
organization. 
Mondragon is based on a cooperative ownership structure which means that every 
employee of the company has a stake in the business. The company touts the motto, 
"there are no cooperatives, only cooperators" (Martinez, 2000). One employee, one vote 
is the general practice of cooperative organizations. This practice removes hierarchical 
benefits and allows each worker to participate in the corporate decision-making of the 
organization. Cooperative businesses often begin as small corporations where each 
member has a direct, hands-on role in the company. For larger cooperative organizations 
such as Mondragon, the employee still has a direct role but it is similar to the role of a 
citizen voting for officials or the practices of a local government. 
The specific structure of Mondragon is extremely complex and involves many 
layers of government. The 150 businesses that make up the MCC are individual 
cooperative organizations that have banded together for competitive and social purposes 
under a parent organization. Mondragon however, is not a federation, but rather one 
company that expanded by opening new cooperatives every few years. The power 
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structure of Mondragon resides in the base of the organization; the employees. The 
bottom-up structure holds managers and governing officials accountable through the use 
of an elected hierarchy. "In this way, the hierarchy exercises power by delegation, 
implying a nonhierarchical organizational structure" (Martinez, 2000, p.62). Because the 
organization is structured in this way, I will explain its organization beginning with the 
role of the employee. Below is a structural map of the organization as displayed on the 
company's website (Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa, 2007). 
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Each individual cooperative has a governing body that reports to the larger MCC 
governing bodies. The highest body of each cooperative is called the general assembly 
and it is required to meet at least once a year. The general assembly is made up of every 
employee within that cooperative and each employee has one vote to cast during 
decision-making. Surveys show that about 70 percent of employees typically attend the 
general assembly meeting. Employees who do not attend are "advised" to do so and if 
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they miss two meetings they lose their vote at the assembly that year. The loss of a vote 
may become permanent if the employee does not start participating in the meetings 
(Cheney, 1999). Any member of the cooperative can call a meeting of the general 
assembly if they have the support of 20% of the employees. The role of this general 
assembly is to nominate members to their Board of Directors, the Social Council, and the 
Audit Committee (Forcadell, 2005). 
These three committees are composed of elected officials from the cooperative 
who monitor the day to day activity and planning of the organization. The Board of 
Directors presents a yearly plan to the general assembly for approval and the Audit 
Committee keeps track of accounts and financial documents. The Social Council takes 
care of member issues and complaints within the firm. Members of this council also 
observe working conditions, fairness in the workplace and communication between 
management and workers (Forcadell, 2005). Juan M. Sin de, Chief Executive Deputy of 
MCC, also notes that the Social Councils take care of all discipline problems within the 
cooperative. "They decide on punishments according to the gravity of disciplinary faults. 
The 'moral' pressure between workers to be responsible and honest with the common 
company should not be undervalued" (Clark, 2004, p. 5). The Management Council is 
another group that is made up of all the elected managers within the company. Typically 
a Manager is elected by members of the general assembly to a four year term (Forcadell, 
2005). 
The individual cooperative is then linked to the MCC government by sectorial 
clusters. These groupings are made up of cooperatives with a similar regional location or 
business drive (Martinez, 2000). For example, if there is a cooperative that makes 
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refrigerators and one that makes freezers, they would be grouped together in a sectorial 
cluster. "There are 23 sector groupings in the MCC" (Martinez, 2000). The goal of 
sectorial clusters is to work with similar businesses to increase competition and gain for 
the entire company. Each cluster also has a general assembly comprised of delegates 
elected by the individual cooperatives. There is also a Sectorial Board of Directors 
comprised of one member from each cooperative (Forcadell, 2005). 
The sectorial clusters are all part of a higher division within MCC. The divisions 
are the highest level of organization for the parent company. "There are nine divisions: 
one financial, one distribution, and seven industrial. The head of each division is an 
MCC vice president" (Martinez, 2000, p.62). The role of the division is to guide the 
planning of each cluster and to determine whether all the clusters are working in harmony 
(Forcadell, 2005). 
The final structural level of Mondragon is the headquarters where divisional vice 
presidents and other leaders meet to create business plans and strategies for the company 
as a whole. The Cooperative Congress is the "supreme body of sovereignty and 
representation" at Mondragon. It is made up of 650 members from all different 
cooperatives who have been elected to the position. It is the job of the Congress to vote 
on the General Policies and Corporate Strategic Plan of the organization. The Pemrnnent 
Commission carries out much of the work of the Congress and it is made up of 18 elected 
members who represent the nine different divisions. The General Council is the 
executive body of the organization and it is run by the president of the organization and 
the nine divisional vice presidents. This council makes plans and recommendations to the 
rest of the governing bodies of Mondragon and also deals with major planning or 
strategic issue the businesses faces (Forcadell, 2005). 
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The complex structure described above is what has made Mondragon a successful 
cooperative business over the past sixty years. The organization, though successful, has 
faced many of the crucial issues discussed by critics. To employees at Mondragon, the 
capitalist market suggests that "we must grow or die" (Cheney, 1999). This fighting 
mentality has helped the company maintain its cooperative structure despite the 
challenges of the market. 
A lack of capital was never a major problem for Mondragon because of the 
Spanish banking laws of the 1950's. First, Mondragon created its own bank, the Caja 
Labor Popular (CLP), which controlled and financed all cooperntive enterprise. The bank 
also had an advantage because at this time cooperative banks were allO\ved to pay a 
higher interest rate to depositors. This loophole made the CLP a popular place to invest 
and helped the capital base at Mondragon to grow (Dow, 2003). 
The role of the CLP also aided in managing capital at Mondragon by investing 
only in affiliated businesses. Until the 1980's all of the CLP's money went into 
Mondragon cooperatives. Because of the affiliation, it was also easier for struggling 
cooperatives to get loans or other short-term assistance from the bank (Dow, 2003). In 
the case of Mondragon, capital is more,easily obtained because the organization is so 
large and has so many participating cooperatives. However, the establishment of the 
private bank has also allowed the firm to monitor and allocate capital more efficiently 
than many other cooperatives. 
32 
Mondragon, unlike some firms, has not limited its growth because of the 
cooperative structure. Though Mondragon started with one small industrial company, it 
grew and expanded by joining many cooperatives together. The structure and governing 
bodies of MCC have changed five times since its inception, mostly to keep employees 
involved in the governance of the larger firm (Cheney, 1999). Though the firm has 
grown successfully for competition in the market, it has had some negative impact on the 
cooperative structure. 
Growth at Mondragon has created distance between employees and managers and 
has had a "cupola" effect. The "cupola" is a colloquial title for the board of directors at 
Mondragon who make most major decisions for the corporation. In his research, George 
Cheney found that many employees now feel removed and separated from the "cupola" 
and feel that they have lost some control over the organization (Cheney, 1999). This far 
away feel is dangerous to the ideals of a cooperative because it signals the creation of a 
new hierarchy. 
In addition to creating distance internally, Mondragon has expanded across 
Europe and into Asia in the last ten years. Several of the companies that MCC acquired 
were not cooperatives and were turned into cooperative organizations. However, because 
the employees at these companies do not understand or relate to cooperative business 
practices, many of the firms are actuallr being run like capitalist companies. Currently, 
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one-fifth of MCC's production is taking place in their expansion companies outside of 
Spain. The growth of MCC has made worker-owners less important in the governing of 
the firm. Only 40 percent of employees at MCC were worker-owners in 2007, a major 
decrease since the reorganization in 1991 (Schneider, 2008). Mondragon is not afraid to 
grow, unlike many cooperatives, but it may be sacrificing cooperative ideals in order to 
compete in the capitalist market. 
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Though Mondragon overcame the risks and the challenges that arose in its 
development, the challenges are still real and have an effect on the day to day business of 
the company. There are also aspects of MC C's cooperative structure that do not meet the 
idealistic hopes of alternative businesses. Sharryn Kashmir's 1990 case study on the 
Mondragon Cooperative revealed that many industrial workers still felt a class-level 
divide between their peers and their supervisors. The supervisors however, often 
commented that all workers were equal and that there was no class-level division 
(Kashmir, 1990). Often, managers and members of the social council feel a stronger 
connection to the ideals of the cooperative than the technical workers, a pattern which has 
appeared in cooperatives around the world. 
Despite the challenges and imperfections of this cooperative, the aspects of the 
organization that make it worthwhile are the levels of democracy and choice that are 
present. MCC employs more women than comparable privatized organizations, more 
managers have worked their way up from the shop floor and employees feel a sense of 
community with their peers (Kashmir, 1990). These benefits alone demonstrate that the 
cooperative model is having a positive impact on not only the business structure but also 
the well-being and satisfaction of the worker. Though every employee may not feel 
connected to the cooperative model, or wish to fully participate in it, the option is always 
available. 
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The Plywood Cooperatives 
The Plywood Cooperatives of the Pacific Northwest are not organized like the 
Mondragon Cooperative. Instead, these cooperatives are independently functioning 
entities without a parent organization. Each worker-owned firm competes directly with 
the other cooperatives as well as with conventional plywood companies. However, 
because many of the firms share a similar business model they are considered a 
successful and competitive clustering of cooperative businesses in America. 
The first Plywood cooperatives were established in the 1920's and reached their 
peak levels of production in the l 970's. The majority of plywood cooperatives were 
formed after World War II when conventional firms were selling out due to bankruptcy. 
The original cooperatives were limited in size by the number of jobs they could offer and 
the capital that they needed to get started (Dow, 2003). In the last thirty years the 
plywood industry has moved away from the Pacific Northwest and the natural decline of 
the industry has affected both cooperative and capitalist firms. Hmvever, the few 
cooperatives, three, that are still in operation in the region have been functional for over 
seventy years (Pencavel, 2001 ). 
In each of these cooperative companies, the employee buys his way into the 
organization on a one share per employee basis. This share entitles the employee to one 
vote in all company decisions (Pencavel, 2001 ). Because membership in a cooperative 
provides guaranteed job security, many employees join for financial reasons. It is only 
after several years of working at the firm that the members ranked democratic 
participation as one of the main reasons to work for a cooperative (Greenberg, 1986). 
35 
Employee participation in the plywood cooperatives is all encompassing but it is 
most apparent at the general membership meetings that occur twice a year. These 
meetings are attended by a majority of employees and attendance is strongly encouraged 
by the company. Topics of discussion at the general meetings range from industry issues 
to alterations in wage rates to electing the board of directors. Sometimes the meetings are 
formal and follow a strictly set agenda while other times the meetings take on a town hall 
feel and any issue can be discussed on the floor (Greenberg, 1986). 
The board of directors is elected at the general membership meeting to act as a 
governing body for the cooperative. Board members can be any employee from any 
position in the firm. The board positions rotate regularly and are not seen as a valued or 
more powerful position in any way. While an employee is serving on the board, he must 
also maintain his regular duties to the company. Therefore, the board members often 
have double the work of a standard employee. Due to openness and transparency 
expectations in the cooperatives, board members must also be available at all times to 
answer any employee questions about policy or decision making within the firm 
(Greenberg, 1986). 
The other role of the board members is to hire an outside employee to act as 
manager to the cooperative. The manager is hired from the outside on the basis of 
business expertise and experience in t~e field. It is not the job of the manager to act as 
supervisor or foreman to the day to day activities of the factory (Greenberg, 1986). 
Unlike many conventional firms, the cooperative members take responsibility for their 
work and tend to keep each other on task and assist in duties beyond their job description. 
This allows the manager to focus on business matters and requires the hiring of fewer 
supervisors for the factory (Pencavel, 2001 ). 
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The manager, though hired from the outside and often paid a higher wage, does 
not establish the same role as a manager in conventional firms. There is no hierarchical 
divide between the employees and the manager because the manager is always 
responsible to the employees. Because they own the company, they can decide to fire the 
manager if they disprove of the work he is doing. As one employee commented, "We 
hire the manager. Running the mill is up to him. If we don't like the way he's running it, 
we can fire his butt" (Greenberg, 1986, p.56). 
The organizational structure of plywood cooperatives is relatively simple 
compared to some companies. In a 1980's study of the remaining plywood cooperatives, 
Pencavel studied the structure and effects of the cooperative system on the plywood 
market. However, the simplicity of the organizational structure is not a reflection of the 
work it takes to make the business successful in the capitalist system. The plywood 
industry in particular is extremely volatile and the value of wood rises and falls based on 
the housing market. In such a system it is necessary to have excess capital in case of a 
low profit year. The plywood cooperatives have historically shied away from taking 
bank loans and instead ask employees to contribute more to the capital fund. In extreme 
occasions, cooperative members took iv.ajor pay cuts in order to fund the business. 
Though this seems like extreme commitment to a corporation, all of the employees 
retained a job during periods when members of conventional firms were unemployed 
(Pencavel, 2001). 
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The Plywood cooperatives have consistently struggled with gaining capital and 
have had to take many more risks than corporations such as Mondragon. Many of the 
Plywood cooperatives were formed by restructuring conventional finns. This process 
limited the amount of capital a company could obtain by how many workers the plant 
could employ. Gaining excess capital in the plywood market became a constant struggle 
(Dow, 2003). 
The Plywood coops resorted to leasing land, bmTowing from family and friends, 
using installment plans to pay for machinery and borrnwing small sums from the Small 
Business Administration. The capital for these cooperatives came together in piece-meal 
form, but the determination of the employees led to fully funded organizations (Dow, 
2003). Many of the capital problems that the Plywood cooperatives faced came when 
dealing with banks that did not trust the idea of lending money to hundreds of worker-
owners. Eventually the plywood cooperatives went elsewhere to gather money since the 
banks were so unpredictable (Pencavel, 2001 ). 
After the initial capital base was collected, the cooperatives began to compete 
with conventional firms in the Northwest region. For these organizations the motto was 
not "grow or die" but rather produce more than your competitor. The cooperatives in the 
Pacific Northwest were shown to have a much lower individual worker output than the 
classical mills. Nevertheless, the overall production of the company was 36 percent 
higher than in conventional firms. This difference occurs because often the workers of a 
cooperative firm are working in teams and cannot easily report individual output. The 
production difference suggests that cooperative workers could go on vacation for an extra 
seven weeks a year and still produce as much as a conventional firm (Pencavel, 200 I). 
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This increased production also comes with a lower management cost because 
despite criticisms about shirking, cooperatives function more successfully with fewer 
managers. Contrary to the views of Alchian and Demsetz, shirking is avoided in 
cooperatives because every employee is watching out for each other (Pencavel, 2001 ). 
The worker-owners manage themselves because they have a stake in the organization as a 
whole. One employee describes his adjustment to the team-oriented feeling of a 
cooperative: "It took me a little while to get used to this because where I worked before 
there was a union and you did your job and you didn't go out and do something else. 
Here you get in and do anything to help ... .I see somebody needs help, well you just go 
help them" (Greenberg, 1986, p. 42). Often, if someone is shirking responsibility, 
another worker-o,vner wi11 make him responsible for his actions. In opposition to the 
criticism, production actually increases when workers supervise themselves (Greenberg, 
1986). 
Though the overall risk in working for a ply,vood cooperative is high, employees 
often find that the work environment and the democratic processes make the risk 
worthwhile. Overall worker satisfaction was also higher in worker-cooperatives than in 
traditional firms (Greenberg, 1986). In the cooperative finn there is more freedom of 
choice for the workers. They are often not confined to one specific task and instead help 
each other on a variety of tasks. The workers also set their own production goals and are 
j 
therefore not just working toward some unknown goal but rather one that they hope to 
meet as individuals (Pencavel, 2001 ). 
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Conclusion 
The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation and the Plywood Cooperatives of the 
Northwest, though vastly different in size, organization and production have managed to 
succeed as worker-owned firms in the capitalist market. These firms have disproved the 
criticisms which may have prevented others from fonning cooperative businesses. The 
obstacles that each of these firms has faced are indeed obstacles and cannot be 
discounted. But as the two organizations have shown, obstacles can be overcome and the 
cooperative system can succeed. If the conventional criticisms can be overcome, then 
what else is needed to create a successful cooperative? 
Both Mondragon and the Plywood cooperatives approached their problems in 
different ways and came up with viable solutions to remain competitive in the capitalist 
market. However, the differences in these two organizations illustrate that there is no 
"right" way to create a cooperative. If the structure, process and ideals of an organization 
can be so different, then what is the model for a \vorker mvned firm? What allows these 
firms to take risks and make changes that will allow them to succeed? 
I argue that one of the main elements in the success or failure of a cooperative is 
the leadership structure and mentality of the organization. The leadership structure of a 
firm includes not only the organization of different jobs and positions, but also what the 
people in those positions actually do. Specifically important is how the leader reacts to 
employees, how he handles challenges and how he views his role in the organization. 
Leadership expectations need to be established at the founding of the organization so that 
during periods of change there is at least one constant and reliable factor that workers can 
relate to. A cooperative with a non-hierarchical structure could fail to be democratic if an 
autocratic leader were elected to management. Similarly, a complete lack of leadership 
skills could leave the cooperative unorganized and in turn unproductive. Finding the 
right leadership style for a cooperative is essential to its success. 
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Though the organizational structures of Mondragon and the Plywood cooperatives 
are very different, the original leadership styles and expectations of the organizations are 
similar. Based on the organizational reports and interviews by Cheney and Kashmir, I 
think that Mondragon is a good example of a leadership structure that was built on a 
vision. Yet, over the years as that vision faded, there was not a solid cooperative-driven 
leadership structure to guarantee democratic processes within the firn1. The lack of this 
structure led MCC to grow and expand in ways that are not in the best interest of the 
cooperative or the worker. 
The original leadership expectations at Mondragon were inspired by the founder, 
Jose Maria ArizmendimTieta. Arizmendi, as he was and is called, used his charm to 
gather supporters and enact his cooperative vision. At the time of Mondragon's 
founding, there were no other cooperatives for Arizmendi to model his organization after. 
He was a self-starter, who with a few friends, decided to take a risk and create a new 
form of business. Arizmendi's business model was extremely idealistic and used the 
rhetoric of charisma to inspire his followers. He wrote that "Cooperavistas ought to 
work together toward the development of [anew order], alongside all who hunger and 
' 
thirst for justice around the world" (Cheney, 1999). 
As a leader, Arizmendi was inspiring and he gave the people a reason to work for 
the cooperatives. He championed open lines of communication and democratic 
participations while creating a vision that drove the organization to succeed and to 
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compete within their local economy and later the larger market (Cheney, 1999). When 
Arizmendi died and Mondragon began to expand, much of his leadership vision and 
charisma was lost in the organizational shuffle. Leadership at the company became task-
oriented and many workers felt that the company was no longer following Arizmendi's 
vision of cooperative activity. Cheney quotes a friend of Arizmendi as saying, "If the 
cooperatives do not return to some of the very values that gave them life in the first place, 
they may become victims of their own success" (Cheney, 1999, p.122). 
Though the passion of Arizmendi's leadership is still discussed at Mondragon, the 
day to day leadership styles of its elected officials has become organizational. Many 
managers are not worker-owners and are hired from outside of the cooperatives. 
According to factory workers, the elected officials and managers are blind to the 
hierarchical divide they create within the plants. The leaders still want to believe in the 
idealism of a perfect social network but in reality their focus on production and capital 
gain has dramatically reduced the amount of democratic participation and communication 
that occurs within the firm (Kashmir, 1996). 
The leaders of Mondragon, both founding and current, have struggled to balance 
the leadership of an idealistic vision, with the organizational skills required to run a 
business in the capitalist market. By first relying on one method and then the other, the 
company has changed its direction andhas isolated many current employees. The 
; 
functionality of MCC in 2008 is vastly different from the structure that Arizmendi put 
into place. The whole structure of the organization and the psychological response of the 
employees is based on these changes made by a few people in power. The leadership 
style and structure of an organization is vital to creating and sustaining the democratic 
atmosphere desired by most cooperatives. 
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The leadership style established within the Plywood Cooperatives is less obvious 
and seems to have less of a direct impact than that of Mondragon. Because the 
organizational structure of these organizations is less complex, so is the amount of direct 
leadership that can be observed. However, the leadership style that has been established 
for hired managers and for the elected members of the board is one of servant~leadership. 
Unlike at Mondragon where leaders saw themselves in a position of power, the leaders at 
the Plywood Coops viewed themselves in a position of servitude. 
The general manager at the Plywood cooperatives may remain constant, but the 
elected members of the board can rotate as often as every year. Because the people in 
leadership positions rotate on a regular basis, the leader remains "one of us," and there is 
less chance that workers will become overtly attached to the ideas or style of one leader. 
The leaders can also be "fired" from their leadership role if the workers are unhappy with 
the results. This stipulation enables the servitude role of leaders in the Plywood 
cooperative, and ensures that the elected leaders are always responsible to the workers 
(Greenberg, 1986). 
Though this system guards against organizational upheaval after leadership 
turnover, it often leaves the firm witho¥t one person to tum too. In traditional business as 
well as many other sectors of society, leaders provide strength and courage in times of 
trial. In the case of the Plywood cooperatives, there is not one face to tum to, or one 
person to count on when challenges arise. The lack of one figurehead worker however, is 
a key element in the development of worker-participation in the firm. Instead of looking 
to one person for guidance, the workers themselves must sole their problems and 
contribute to the leadership process. 
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In the following chapter I attempt to more deeply examine issues of cooperative 
functionality, democratic participation and leadership structures through a case study of 
the Weaver Street Cooperative Market. The organization is not in the industrial field and 
has its own distinct cooperative and leadership structures. The case study explores the 
organizational, personal and leadership aspects of Weaver Street through qualitative and 
quantitative research. 
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Chapter 3 
Creating a Successful Cooperative 
The cooperative business model is a successful alternative to the typically 
hierarchical structures found in traditional businesses. Many cooperatives, however, 
differ in structure and philosophy; there is not a single "right" way to run a worker-
owned firm. Because there is no blueprint for cooperatives, I am interested in exploring 
what makes a cooperative successful and specifically what type of leadership is needed to 
effectively run a cooperative firm. Once a successful style is found the next question is, 
what is going to make it accessible to the worker? Based on leadership theory and the 
need for a democratic cooperative environment, I argue that there are three leadership-
related factors that promote cooperative success and stability within the organization. 
Within the cooperative business a transformational leadership style must be 
espoused not only by the general manager, but also the board of directors and all 
members of the formal governing body. Transformational leadership is a style in which 
the leader inspires the followers to work for a vision and for intrinsic rewards rather than 
material benefits. The leaders of the organization must also either possess or adopt the 
psychological trait of Openness to Experience, one of the "Big Five" personality traits 
described by Lew Goldberg in his 1990 paper on personality descriptors. Finally, the 
organization must learn to balance the need for stability within a democratic organization 
with the need to compete in a risk-filled market. 
A transformational leadership style is necessary in all levels of cooperative 
management, specifically in the role of the General Manager. A transformational leader 
"is charismatic such that the follower seeks to identify with the leader and to emulate 
them" (Bass, 1998, p.5). In an organization where ideals tend to precede the business 
model, it is important to have a leader who is confident in these ideals and who the 
worker-owners trust and will work hard for. 
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A transformational leader also challenges and creates meaning for his followers. 
He or she pushes them to work hard and they respond because of their willingness to 
work for this person. This leadership style is intellectually stimulating and challenges 
each person at his o¼n level. The leader becomes a mentor to followers and gives 
employees personal attention, making each follower feel respected. In practice, the 
transformational leader uses language that will arouse team spirit, is enthusiastic and 
reframes problems instead of accepting the nom1al path of action. Most importantly, the 
transformational leadership style is not reward-based. This element is crucial in the 
cooperative firm where all workcr-ovmers are supposed to be working toward the same 
goals without thought for advancement in a hierarchy. Transformational leaders help to 
create the impression of intrinsic worth from a task rather than monetary or material gain 
(Bass, 1998). 
The significant transformational leader in the firm is the General Manager, or 
Chief Officer of the organization. As in a traditional fim1, people often need one person 
to look to in times of crisis or challenge. Though all workers have a say in the decisions 
made in a cooperative firm, it is still useful to have one strong leader at the helm. 
; 
Transformational leadership is especially helpful in times of crisis because the leader can 
· create a sense of calm. The trust-based relationship that is built between a 
transfom1ational leader and his followers creates a sense of consistency and stability 
within the organization (Bass, 1998). 
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Transfonnational leadership will be beneficial to cooperatives because it 
reinforces the ideals of such organizations while giving them stability. As noted in the 
studies of Mondragon and the Plywood cooperatives, the founding stages of a 
cooperative are crucial to its eventual success. A transfomrntional leader would be 
beneficial in the start-up stages of a cooperative because he or she would be able to give 
some direction to the vision of the group. The leader or leaders would also be able to 
create a group identity for all workers and would motivate the followers to complete 
difficult tasks. 
Transfonnational leaders are also necessary in cooperatives because they are 
accessible to their followers. If the goal of a cooperative organization is to increase 
worker-participation and involvement in the organization, then the worker needs to feel 
like he or she can access the system. The relationship between a transfom1ational leader 
and the follower should be one of give and take. In the case of a cooperative, the leader 
should be able to offer direction to the follower and the follower should be able to freely 
offer advice or ask questions of the leader. This relationship not only provides autonomy 
for the individual worker but it benefits the cooperative governing system by encouraging 
participation and input by each employee. 
The previously discussed leadership of Mondragon's founder, Jose Arizmendi, is 
an example of a transformational leadership style. Arizmendi convinced a whole town to 
follow his cooperative vision and did so while creating stability for the organization. He 
was able to communicate clearly and effectively with his peers and he had the necessary 
organizational skills to bring his vision to life. 
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The language of a transfonnational leader is specifically helpful in a cooperative 
because it is often the language of equality. A transfonnational leader will not place 
himself or herself above other people and will use language that is accessible to anyone 
who wishes to participate in a movement. Arizmendi was able to move people with his 
language because it was the language of social change. People responded to his words 
and looked to him for a way to act upon the vision. Arizmendi then encouraged them to 
work together, as a unit to make a new system, a cooperative system. His encouragement 
and guidance combined with the efforts of like-minded people made Mondragon into a 
successful cooperative (Cheney, 1999). 
The founders of Equal Exchange, a coffee distribution cooperative in the 
Northeast United States, also reflect the transfonnational leadership style that aids in the 
success of a cooperative. A case study of this cooperative by Thad Williamson reports 
that the three founders held planning meetings for three years before even collecting 
capital for their organization (Williamson, 2007). Once the blueprints for the company 
had been laid and a non-negotiable vision had been decided upon, the three men quit their 
jobs and began to raise money. These men continued to make high-risk decisions and to 
sacrifice personal gain for the company while it floundered for several years before 
making a profit. The men were adamant about their vision and accepted the personal 
sacrifice in order to meet the needs of the cooperative. The sacrifice by these men 
allowed the cooperative to reach a developmental stage in which worker paiiicipation 
mattered and could function effectively. 
Though other leadership styles could motivate followers and create a consistency 
within the organization, transfonnational leadership is more fitting for cooperatives 
48 
because of what it does and does not give to its followers. Unlike transactional 
leadership, a style based on completing tasks and working for rewards, transformational 
leadership does not offer a specific reward or result for committing to a cause. 
Transactional leadership focuses on creating a chain of command where the 
leader instructs a follower and if the follower completes the task, he is re\varded. This 
style is converse to the ideals of a cooperative because within such organizations 
employees are not rewarded as individuals but rather for what they do as a collective. 
Transactional leadership also suggests a sense of unilateral authority over which the 
employee has no control. In a cooperative, where employees have a voice in the 
governance of the organization, this style does not make sense. 
Beyond the obvious transformational leadership style of the General Manager, 
transformational practices should be taught to all management-level employees of a 
cooperative. This leadership style fosters a social support network and creates a sense of 
belonging among workers (Bass, 1998). Cascading levels of transformational leadership 
allow for more individualized attention on the workers as well as a direct path for 
workers to express their opinions about the organization. If transformational leadership 
were the norm in cooperative environments, then workers would feel comfortable 
participating in the governing practices of the organization. 
Transformational leadership is r,ositively correlated with the personality trait 
Openness to Experience; a trait I argue is necessary for successful leadership within a 
cooperative (Judge & Bono, 2000). Openness to Experience will benefit the leaders of a 
cooperative organization because it is a personality trait that accommodates divergent 
thinking, creativity and a sense of understanding (McCrae, 1987). The Big Five 
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personality traits that people can possess include Openness to Experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism (Craik, Hogan & 
Wolfe, 1993). While all of these traits lead to different styles of leadership, as well as 
styles of social interaction, I argue that Openness to Experience is the most important for 
a democratic leader. 
Openness to Experience is often thought of as an intrapersonal trait because much 
of a person's openness is related to intellect and the thought process. Aspects of 
Openness to Experience include high levels of intelligence, absorption of material, thin 
boundaries, tough mindedness and a need for cognition. Leaders who possess openness 
are more likely to try new tactics and listen to the opinions of many people because they 
possess a curious nature. Though many of the characteristics of Openness to Experience 
are internal, the thought processes affect the social interactions, political affiliations and 
cultural climate that surround a person (McCrae, 1987). 
This personality trait is conducive to the cooperative environment because it 
encourages creativity and a free flow of ideas. Leaders who possess high levels of 
Openness to Experience will benefit cooperatives by providing an educated opinion and 
by fostering open lines of communication. Acceptance of new ideas and of different 
opinions will enhance the democratic decision-making process and benefit all worker-
owners. 
Finding the balance between stability and risk-taking is one of the largest 
challenges for a cooperative firm. Not only does balance differ for every organization, 
but it can change from year to year, or even day to day. Balance is not an aspect of 
cooperative development that can be planned for in advance, but rather, it must be 
constantly addressed and developed throughout the existence of the organization. 
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Cooperative organizations, as democratic societies, need a sense of stability in 
order to function. As seen by governments around the world, democracy cannot succeed 
when there is not a bedrock of structure and civility. First, economic stability is needed 
in order to stabilize the market so that people have a certain level of physical and 
emotional comfort within the society. Then civility must be created between all of the 
people participating in the democracy, finally the system must function successfully so 
that the people can participate. All of these elements need to be in place for a democracy 
to run smoothly, and they all require a strict set of guidelines or rules that are constantly 
enforced. 
The problem with this solid foundation is that it is often disturbed by the rapid 
fluctuation and risk involved in the capitalist market. As the market changes, 
spontaneous and often risky decisions need to be made that can disturb the legitimacy of 
the democratic system. When a traditional company has one person who can make risk-
based decisions it is easy to act quickly. Yet for a cooperative firn1, such decisions 
require input from all worker-owners and thus take time and action that may hinder 
immediate growth or progress. Firms must determine how to create a stable and yet 
adaptive cooperative environment within their market. 
The following section attempts to analyze how well a specific cooperative created 
a stable and successful leadership environment within its organization. The case study is 
a qualitative analysis of Weaver Street Market that includes my own observations about 
the site and interviews with several employees. In this section I will address and 
reference many of the leadership issues just discussed. 
Weaver Street Cooperative Market 
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Weaver Street Cooperative Market (WSM) is a hybrid grocery cooperative 
located in Carrboro, North Carolina. The mission of the company is to include workers 
and consumers in the democratic processes of the finn, to foster community 
development, raise ecological awareness, offer fair prices and business practices and to 
educate the community about cooperative business. The organization was founded in 
1988 and has functioned successfully by using traditional cooperative methods as well as 
transformational leadership, openness to experience and a balanced business strategy. 
WSM currently has three stores in the Carrboro and Hillsboro region of North 
Carolina. Last year the cooperative surpassed $20 million in sales and had a profit of 
$359,910. Sales increased by more than 10 percent in each of the three WSM stores and 
its new restaurant, Panzanella, increased profits by seven percent. Currently there are 90 
worker-owners at the cooperative and 11,765 consumer-owners. 
The organization is a community based grocery store that focuses on providing 
artisan, local, sustainable and fair trade products. Rather than acting as a selling agent for 
manufacturers, the coop hopes to act a~ a buying agent for the members of their 
community. Therefore it often takes surveys and collects consumer opinions about the 
products sold in its stores. Based on the ethical beliefs of the founders of WSM, the 
stores do not carry products that could be in any way harmful to the health of its 
customers. For example, the stores do not carry tobacco products, meat or fish that were 
produced with antibiotics or hormones, foods with high fructose com syrup or other 
harmful additives, foods with trans fats or endangered fish. 
The environment at Weaver Street Market is friendly and community oriented. 
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When I visited to conduct interviews with WSM employees, I found the Carrboro store 
filled with shoppers and cafe-goers. The main store sits at the crossroads of a popular 
area in downtown Carrboro. There arc other restaurants and shops in the area including a 
cooperative bar, a cooperative hardware store and a cooperative radio station. Behind the 
WSM store sits a Harris Teeter, a traditional grocery store that competes with the 
cooperative. 
The store backs up to an old factory building, Carr Mill, which has been 
converted into a shopping area. The shops inside the factory building are eclectic and 
seem to fit with the artsy vibe of the neighborhood. The downtown area that surrounds 
the store was populated but had a very small-town feel. Cars and trucks filled the roads 
but the area also appeared walkable and bikable. 
The store itself has a plain wooden exterior and appears run down from the 
outside. Dark green trim around the building gives it a natural feel that is somewhat 
negated by the large glass windows that cover half of the building. There is an expansive 
lawn in front of the store with about twenty picnic tables and a random assortment of 
chairs covering it. Several people were sitting out at these tables reading, eating and 
j 
talking despite the cold weather that day. There is also a small playground that was 
populated by a group of children and their parents when I arrived. To one side of the 
store, there is what appears to be a tent but is actually a heated outdoor eating area. It is 
an extension of the indoor cafe. 
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When I entered the store it seemed similar to other small grocery stores I have 
visited. There were florescent lights glowing above rows and rows of packaged food 
items and the perimeter of the store housed produce, meats and cheeses. What stood out 
about WSM was not its organization but rather the products they were selling. Many of 
the foods were organic and the produce was often local. 
There were fliers and pamphlets all over the store that explained food choices and 
the philosophy of WSM. Notices about the status of the cooperative and where to find 
information on how to become a member were located at every register. The store 
publishes a monthly magazine that discusses WSM board decisions, upcoming events in 
the community, and information about new products or changes at the store. These 
magazines are free to customers and are located next to every entrance of the building. 
The WSM cafe is adjacent to the main grocery store and there is a coffee bar as 
well as a hot and cold lunch bar available in that section of the store. While I sat in the 
cafe people came and went eating lunch, reading and meeting friends. Several groups of 
people seemed to meet for the first time and then sat and conversed while they ate lunch. 
People came in groups and as individuals to eat or have a cup of coffee and the 
atmosphere seemed comfortable and light. The cafe also provided wireless internet 
services that several customers were using. 
The staff of WSM was visible t~roughout the store and was available when I 
asked about the location of specific products. The employee population was also 
relatively diverse for such a small town. The floor staff who were working during my 
visit included Caucasians, African Americans, Hispanics and Asians. The ages of the 
employees also varied with the youngest employee appearing in his mid-twenties and the 
oldest in her mid-fifties. Employees all wore slightly different clothing but each person 
had an apron on. The staff appeared to have a variety of different tasks to complete 
including but not limited to shelving, assisting customers, or checking people out at the 
register. 
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At Weaver Street I interviewed the Head Training Manager, Windy Willer, to 
acquire an overview of the organization. 1 Willer provided general information about the 
purpose and design of the company as well as her personal assessment of the success of 
the cooperative model. Willer was frank and forthright about both the positive aspects of 
the organization as well as improvements that could be made at Weaver Street. 
WSM differs from the previously discussed cooperatives because it has both 
worker and consumer owners. A coop of this type is often referred to as a hybrid 
cooperative because it gives democratic power to several categories of people. The 
cooperative sells a variety of products to the community and provides community space 
for events and gatherings; therefore it is very popular for customers to buy-in to the 
cooperative. The consumer-ownership model of the business was part of the original 
vision for the cooperative because it would create a community atmosphere and aid in 
raising capital. "There is something really valuable in having the whole community 
involved in their grocery and that they come there and they volunteer and they participate 
and they know what's going on in their universe," said Windy Willer, training manager 
.> 
forWSM. 
A consumer share of the cooperative costs $75 for a single-family household, 
$135 for a two people and $175 for three or four adults. The investment in WSM is 
1 A top level manager or Board Member was not available at Weaver Street because they are undergoing 
developmental planning and fundraising drives for the construction of a new headquarters building. 
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refundable to the member at any time. Consumer membership entitles a person to a small 
discount at the register as well as one vote per person in the annual meeting to elect the 
Board of Directors. Two seats on the Board of Directors are saved for consumer-owners 
who run for the office just like worker-owners. 
Worker-ownership in WSM can be bought after six months of employment at the 
store. An employee share costs $500 and can be taken out of the employee's salary on a 
bi-weekly basis. The bi-weekly pay investment is taken for a period of one year and 
equals $19.24 per pay period. Employee ownership in the firm is also worth one vote in 
electing members to the Board of Directors. Two worker-owners are also elected to the 
Board and anyone who is a member can run for the positions. Worker-owners are invited 
to attend monthly management meetings to discuss issues within the cooperative and to 
help make decisions for the organization. 
At the end of every year, worker owners receive a dividend from the profits of the 
organization. From 1988 to 1994 the organization did not profit because it was 
attempting to gamer support and grow within the community. In 1995 the organization 
showed a profit and then continued to profit for the next few years. When this happened 
the organization devised a plan to allocate the dividends among employees and to 
reinvest some ofit into the company. The amount of money each employee receives is 
determined by the profits of the organi~ation as a whole and the number of hours the 
employee worked that year. Currently, one percent of the dividend is invested directly 
back into the company every year and the rest is distributed to the worker-owners in the 
form of an internal account. 
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The dividend investment process or "vesting," often confuses employees, but it is 
a successful business model because it allows the organization to use the entire dividend 
as capital for the organization. The dividend that worker-owners receive each year goes 
into a personal internal account where it is not only available to the finn, but also accrues 
interest for the worker. Because the dividend is taxable income to the worker, WSM 
writes the worker a check for 20 percent of the payout each year in order to cover the 
taxes on the income they have invested in the firm. The "vesting" process is also an 
attempt by the organization to encourage long-term employment. If an employee works 
for WSM for five years or more they receive all of their dividends plus their initial 
investment of $500 when they leave. If the employee works at the coop for less than five 
years then they only receive the initial investment and a portion of their dividends. 
At WSM there exists both an elected, and a non-elected hierarchy. The 
participative governance system is made up of workers, managers, board members and 
the General Manager. The diagram below represents the governmental system at Weaver 
Street. 
Non-Owner 
Employees 
General Manager 
Board of Directors 
2 employee owners 
2 consumer owners 
2 at-large members 
Employee Owners 
Mid-level Managers 
Department Managers 
Clerks and other Employees 
Consumer Owners 
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Non-Owner 
Consumers 
The above table demonstrates the chain of command at WSM. The items in bold 
represent voting members of the organization and the other items represent organizational 
elements within each group. The chain of command at Weaver Street looks like the 
traditional pyramidal business structure of a corporate firm. The difference however, is 
that four members on the Board of Directors are elected by the owners. Leadership in the 
organization trickles down from the General Manager and the Board to Mid-level 
Managers. These managers are typically responsible for an entire store and deliver 
pertinent organizational information to all employees. Other leadership roles are held by 
department managers who supervise employees and act as a go-between to the Board. 
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All employees at WSM are not required to be worker-owners, but most managers 
and long-term employees are shareholders. Employees are hired to work at WSM based 
on skills, interests and potential commitment to the organization. The hiring process is 
similar to that of any traditional firm. Once an employee is hired, he goes through a 
three-month worker training period. The employee works in the WSM store and also 
attends training workshops about the cooperative model and what it means to be a 
worker-owner. After six months of employment, the worker can buy a share of the 
cooperative. 
Management positions are also selected on the basis of skill and productivity in 
the workplace. Unlike some cooperatives, where management is elected, at WSM, the 
managers are promoted or hired based on their ability to work with a team and 
accomplish tasks. Willer notes that it would be beneficial for the cooperative model if 
managers were hired based on communication and positive decision making, but those 
intangibles are hard to measure. Instead managers are hired or promoted based on 
product sales and departmental success, then they are taught about inclusive decision 
making and democratic management. 
The Board of Directors at WSM is partially elected and partially nominated. 
Unlike some of the other cooperatives discussed, this method of governance has the least 
direct-democracy involved. The Board of Directors at WSM is made up of seven 
members, two elected consumer-ovvners, two elected worker-ov-mers, the general 
manager and two additional members chosen by the current board. The two additional 
members are selected based on what the cooperative hopes to achieve in the upcoming 
year. If the major project of the business is going to be community development and 
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outreach, then the chosen board members will have some proficiency or expertise in that 
area. The additional members are always chosen based on the qualifications for a specific 
job. 
The Board of Directors at WSM follows a Policy Governance system. This 
method of board governance was designed by John Carver, a psychologist and author 
who studies organizational structures and governing boards. The model and attempts to 
separate the task of meeting the vision of the organization from the day to day tasks that 
make up the path towards that vision. More simply, Policy Governance allows the Board 
to separate the Ends, or economic goals of the company, from the Means, how the 
company achieves its goals. 
The Policy Governance Model stipulates that the board is "foremost a voice from 
ownership to management and only secondarily a link in the other direction" (Carver, 
2002, p.9). Because governance should be about what the owners want, the board is 
supposed to act as a voice of the owners. In the case of WSM, the board is a voice for the 
workers. To maximize the efficiency of the board, Policy Governance stipulates that the 
board will not tell the management how to do their job, but rather, will tell them what 
needs to be done. The board formulates a set of "Ends Policies," or things that the 
workers want to see accomplished, and then submits this to the management (Carver, 
2002). 
The board also formulates a brief set of "Executive Limitations Policies" which 
do not tell the management what to do, but rather, state what the management may not 
do. This set of limitations is often short because breaches in ethical or managerial policy 
can be dealt with by the board as necessary. Once these statements are written, they are 
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submitted to the management and it is then the management's job to find solutions to or 
address the issues presented by the board. The main goal of Policy Governance is to help 
the board successfully act as a voice for the owners of an organization (Carver, 2002). 
The role of the Board at WSM is to figure out and decide, based on the input of 
workers, what the company needs. The board meets regularly to decide what will be best 
for the company, how it needs to grow and to address individual requests or issues 
brought forth by the workers. Once the board discusses the issues, they come to a 
decision about what exactly the cooperative needs and then they present these needs to 
the General Manager. It is then the job of the General Manager to come up with a 
method for solving these problems. Once the specific issue has been turned over to the 
General Manager, it is, for the most part, out of the Board's and the worker's control. 
At WSM, the General Manager always sits on the Board of Directors. Ruffin 
Slater, a founder of WSM, has been the general manager for about fifteen years. Ruffin, 
as he is called by employees, is one of the main reasons that WSM has been so successful 
over the past twenty years. A former employee and the current Project Director for the 
National Center of Employee Ownership, Loren Rodgers, said that the structure of the 
organization and the manager are one entity, "it is artificial to tear them apart." 
According to former and current employees, Ruffin's success as a leader of WSM 
comes from his personal business knowledge and his leadership style. The style, as 
described by Willer and Rodgers also happens to be transformational. The descriptions 
given of Ruffin by these two employees give him an almost deistic status. This status 
comes from his communication style as a charismatic and passionate leader of the 
organization. He, more than any other member of the cooperative, seems to always 
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remember and look out for the vision of the organization. "He always has the interest of 
cooperatives in general, the interest of our cooperative in specific, the interest of our 
community, the interest of our workers, as his priority. I trust that completely," Willer 
said. 
Beyond the vision of the organization, Ruffin is a transfom1ational leader because 
of his own capability in the business world. He is able to motivate people and push them 
to work harder because of his own intelligence and the value you that he places on 
cooperative education. Rodgers described him as a "savvy businessperson" who only 
hires competent employees. Ruffin is "a very systematic person who documents and 
thinks clearly and communicates clearly," said Rodgers. Willer described Ruffin's 
competency through his actions during board meetings. He is the one person in the room, 
she says, who can sit through everyone spouting off ideas and then summarize them into 
one major idea or point. "He plots it all out in a way that makes sense and I'm like, did 
we have that brilliant plan? Because ... I did not recognize that brilliant plan!" 
In general, Rodgers states, these competent qualities permeate throughout the 
organization. His leadership shows people how to live and work for the ideal as well as 
how to be competent in business. In the case of WSM, Ruffin helps to create a balance 
between the stability of the organization and the risk-based climate of the capitalist 
market. 
Though Ruffin's transformational style is felt by many members of the 
cooperative, Willer comments that it is a constant struggle to create a cascading system of 
transformational leadership among the management. "There's a real disconnect that 
we're working on and we're learning better about having department managers solicitous 
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of feedback and understanding that they're the bridge, they're the communication bridge 
and you can put as much as you want out there on posters and walls and market 
messengers, and newsletters in peoples boxes but real communication happens with 
direct supervisors." Because transformational leadership does not come easily to all 
people, Willer, in her role as the training manager, attempts to teach managers how to 
relate to their employees in a way that is conducive to the participatory governance of the 
cooperative. 
One element of what Willer teaches employees and managers is how to use 
language in order to relate to people. Her training reflects elements of the Openness to 
Experience trait as a way to understand other people in the work environment. Willer 
tells employees to use "I" and "we" language instead of "they" phrasing when they are 
talking about the company. "Instead of saying 'I don't know what they're doing .. .' who 
do you think 'they' is?" she said. "That is you and me ... we're a little business in 
comparison, 'they' is that guy over there and you and the person you're talking to." 
Inclusive language and acceptance of the group as a whole is a way of creating a group 
oriented frame of mind within the cooperative. Teaching acceptance of the group is a 
first step in advocating the acceptance of new ideas and general Openness to Experience 
within the organization. 
Worker participation in the governance of WSM is encouraged and accepted, 
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though it is not always obvious in the day to day labor of the employees. Windy Willer 
explained that employees are often more interested in when they get to take their break, 
how much they get paid, where they will be working and what kind of products they sell 
than how they influence the long-term vision of the coop. Understanding that not 
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everyone wants to think about cooperative idealism all the time is part of the struggle for 
management and the Board of Directors. 
"Senior level management can be very, very open to input; can be solicitous of 
feedback and making sure everybody understands where they stand in the coop, and what 
their rights and responsibilities are. But I feel like the only time its really successful is 
when the direct supervisor is successful in making that happen," Willer said. Workers 
want to participate and they do participate, when they feel like their manager is listening 
to them and that their participation may actually have some influence. It is finding a 
balance between participation and the day to day job that makes WSM successful. 
Finding the balance between achieving the ideals of a cooperative firm and 
creating a successful business has been difficult for WSM at times. The company, 
however, has found a sense of stability because it has not been distracted by the typical 
cooperative setbacks. Often cooperatives lose focus and think either too big or too small 
because they don't want to commit to traditional business philosophy. Because of the 
leadership and often traditional economic plan of WSM, the organization has been able to 
find its niche and the community and create internal stability. 
"We're not a 'real' coop, we get that a lot," Willer said. "Well actually, we're a 
successful coop, that doesn't mean we're not a real coop." Often, it means that WSM 
thinks about its business in business terms and tries not to get too carried away into the 
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idealism of cooperative theory. For example, when the chain grocer Trader Joes opened 
a store in Carrboro and some employees panicked. Trader Joes offers products similar to 
that ofWSM and carried a national brand name. The competition appeared unbearable. 
The Board and General Manager, however, had a different plan. Instead of competing 
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directly with Trader Joes by becoming similar to them, WSM would keep doing what 
made it successful; they would not change just because someone challenged them. This 
concept benefited the company when Trader Joes contacted to store asking to purchase 
WSM homemade bread to sell in their store. By remaining true to its niche and purpose 
in the community, WSM actually benefited from its competition. 
The overview of WSM that I collected through personal experience and 
interviews with employees is that it is a company that is willing to work hard in order to 
succeed. The willingness to brainstonn ways to compete while securing a community 
niche, the collective leadership style and the emphasis on the worker and the customer 
suggests a dedication to many aspects of responsible business. In the next section I 
explore many of these same issues quantitatively from the employees' perspective. 
Chapter 4 
Weaver Street Market Employee-Ownership Survey 
Overview 
In the previous chapter I looked at the structure and success of Weaver Street 
Market from an experiential and interview-based perspective. Now I will change 
direction and explore the cooperative through quantitative data provided by the 
employees of this organization. 
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In 2003 the employees of Weaver Street Market were given the Ownership 
Culture Survey, a product distributed by the National Center for Employee Ownership 
(NCEO). The survey was created for employee-owned companies so that they could 
analyze the success and validity of ownership practices within their organizations. 131 
WSM employees completed the survey in January and February of 2003. There was an 
87 percent response rate, which is higher than most organizations surveyed by the NCEO 
(Executive Summary, 2003). 
The survey was composed of 75 scale-oriented questions. The rating scales used 
were either a 1 to 10 or 1 to 7 scale where 1 represents a strong disagreement with the 
statement and 7 or 10 represent strong agreement with the statement. Survey questions 
covered topics of mvnership, participation, satisfaction in the workplace and employee 
responsibility. 
In the following section I will often compare Weaver Street to about 21 other 
companies that have returned survey data to the NCEO. These evaluations are based on 
NCEO reports and comparison data. When terms such as stronger or weaker are used I 
am referring to the NCEO language as defined by the organization: 
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"In this report, we have used the terms 'stronger' and 'weaker.' There is clearly not universal standard of 
what constitutes a stronger or weaker attitude or company. We use these phrases as a useful short-hand. 
'Stronger' scores indicate either agreement with positively worded items of disagreement with negatively 
worded items. In other words, for positively worded items, higher scores are tenned 'stronger,' while for 
negatively worded items, lower scores are 'stronger"' (Executive Summary, 2003, p.7). 
I will also use the term "average" to recognize that WSM scored about the same 
as other companies who completed the survey. 
In the comparisons to other companies it is important to note that most of the 
organizations that have completed this survey are ESOPs and do not follow a cooperative 
model. Therefore the comparison of WSM data to these companies may be skewed 
because cooperatives have a different organizational mentality and mission than ESOP 
firms. This comparison can be considered a strength for WSM however because ESOP 
firms that practice both employee ownership and workplace participation are often more 
democratically governed than traditional firms; Scharf (2006) found, for instance, that the 
combination of ownership and participation leads to increased "horizontal monitoring" 
behavior in which employees sought to hold one another accountable in the workplace. 
The firms that participated in the Ownership Culture Survey are disproportionately of this 
type; participation in the survey implies a commitment to employee participation and 
development of an "ownership culture." Thus, if WSM performs better than this sample 
ESOPs on measures of democratic participation and accountability, it also most likely 
performs better than traditional firms. 
The summary results of the data suggest that Weaver Street Market scored 
stronger or substantially stronger than other employee-owned firms on 26 survey items. 
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The company was average on 40 items and scored substantially weaker than other 
employee-owned fim1s on 5 items (Executive Summary, 2003). In the following chapter 
I first present an overview of the descriptive data from this survey specifically focusing 
on issues of ownership, pay and rewards, the work environment and management and 
leadership. I then proceed to explore several hypotheses about variations in the survey 
responses based on sub-group variables such as ovmcrship status, tenure and job title. 
Descriptive Data 
In this first section of data analysis I look at the mean responses from WSM 
employees to a variety of survey items. I then compare and contrast that descriptive data 
with other employee-owned firms. These comparisons are based on the survey 
commentary provided by the NCEO. The descriptive data is divided into categories 
which include: general feelings about ownership (Table 1 ), cooperative rights and 
responsibilities (Table 2), leadership and accountability (Table 3) and workplace 
satisfaction (Table 4). The purpose of examining this descriptive data is to gain a 
quantitative overview of several categories which are vital to individual worker 
satisfaction and the success of a democratic workplace. 
Ownership at WSM was measured with a variety of questions (Table 1) ranging 
from "How much do you feel like an owner of this company?" to "I understand the coop 
idea." The descriptive data shows that employees at WSM feel more like owners than 
employees in similar companies. Not only do employees have a strong feeling of 
ownership but they have a connection and understanding of the cooperative ideals that 
give them rights within the company (Executive Summary, 2003). 79 percent of 
employees at WSM have some understanding of the cooperative system and what it 
means to be an employee within the system (Core Values, 2003). 
Table 1 
Ownership 
Item Mean 
How much do you feel like an owner? 5.65 
I understand the coop idea 5.47 
How important is ownership to you? 7.68 
The company must take risks in order to 
prosper 5.29 
I receive my fair share of company successes 4.29 
At this company people avoid new ideas and 
do things the way they have always been 
done 3.33 
% of employees who 
answered agree or 
(SD) strongly agree 
(2.81) 58% 
( 1.46) 88% 
(2.04) 86% 
(1.44) 90% 
(1.80) 70% 
(1.81) 25% 
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Though the employees may have an understanding of the system, they only have 
an average entrepreneurship score (Table 1: Company Must Take Risks; I Receive Fair 
Share; Avoid New Ideas)(Table 2: I Actively Contribute; When The Company Really 
Needs). According to the NCEO summary of this data, a strong entrepreneurship score 
would suggest that employees not only understand ownership but that they recognize the 
risks and slow monetary growth involved in a cooperative and are still willing to 
participate and commit to the firm. Entrepreneurship suggests a valid interest and 
dedication to the cooperative goals and activities of the business both by \vay of 
participation and daily tasks. 
Employees at WSM showed a lower score in this area and thus may not have not 
fully accepted cooperative ideas to the point of carrying them out individually in the 
workplace. This is represented by their below average responses to questions about 
accepting company risk and average responses to hard work within the organization 
(Core Values, 2003). Because employees seem to truly understand the cooperative model, 
these results can be attributed to several things including respondents attitude, work 
environment at the time of the survey as well as the concept that in any organization 
some individuals are not willing to sacrifice for the whole. 
At WSM employees were expressive about the importance of rights and 
participation in their workplace (Table 2). More than at other firms, workers at WSM 
wanted to have a say in each element of the company. Employees feel that they deserve a 
transparent work-environment and that they deserve access to team-based as well as 
company-wide information (Core Values, 2003). The same employees however, 
answered weakly on issues of exercising responsible decision-making in the workplace. 
WSM employees, unlike workers in average participatory firms, are not willing to let 
others make decisions for them, even if the person is higher ranking (Executive 
Summary, 2003). 
Table2 
Participation 
Item Mean 
The company encourages people to 
participate in decisions that affect their day-
to-day work 4.57 
Worker-owners deserve to have a say over 
how the company is run 5.98 
I can make any reasonable changes I need 
to make in my work environment , 5.12 
I actively contribute to group problem 
solvino efforts in my work area 5.8 
When the company really needs it, I am 
willing to do extra work to Qet the job done. 6.2 
I think that on some issues, I should leave 
the decision making to managers with 
specialized knowledoe 4.96 
% of employees 
who answered 
(SD) 
agree or strongly 
a2ree 
(1.77) 58% 
(1.34) 86% 
(1.58) 71% 
(1.25) 90% 
(1.09) 95% 
(1.7) 66% 
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In this case an apparent disconnect (Table 2) arises because employees want to 
adhere directly to the ideals of participation. Despite the fact that WSM scored more 
weakly than ESOP employees on issues of relinquishing control, two-thirds of employees 
at still said that managers should get to make some decisions if they know more about the 
subject. The fact that WSM scored more weakly than an ESOP, however, could be 
expected in a cooperative environment. If employees adhere directly to the ideas of 
cooperative involvement and individual commitment to the decision-making process, it 
seems natural that they would not want to give up those inherent rights. Though the 
tension of relinquishing control and adhering to an equal work environment could 
become strenuous within cooperatives it suggests that the ideals of equality and voice are 
actually being achieved. Though WSM scored more weakly than ESOPs on this issue the 
response could suggest that they are also creating a more equal and participatory work 
environment. 
Active participation scores (Table 2: I actively contribute, when the company 
really needs it) are also lower in the responsibility category because fewer workers admit 
to contributing to group problem solving or being actively involved in company-wide 
issues. For many of these employees, the ideas of participation and ownership seem 
more prevalent than actually doing the work that will help the firm succeed. Though this 
data suggests weaker support for action by the employees, the lack of survey items on 
' 
this subject cannot adequately dictate why employees may be hesitant in these areas. 
Multiple outstanding factors such as motivation by management, hours worked and 
personal needs may influence how much risk or above and beyond time an employee is 
willing to commit to the organization. 
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Leadership and workforce accountability at WSM are related to the imbalance of 
rights and responsibilities in the workplace. However, in questions about accountability 
in the workplace, where accountability refers to acknowledgement of a decision and 
acceptance of future consequences, worker responsibility outweighs worker rights (Table 
3). Accountability items revealed that workers feel that they are individually accountable 
but do not see the leadership as being equally accountable. Though the numeric statistics 
appear similar, the frequencies in this data and their relation to responses from other 
firms place the Leadership Accountability variable at average and Workforce 
Accountability above average. In participatory firms, employees have the right to work 
in a setting where the leadership will admit mistakes and they have a responsibility to 
admit mistakes themselves. At WSM leadership accountability scores were average in 
comparison to other employee-owned firms while workforce accountability scores were 
high (Core Values, 2003). 
Item 
Table 3 
Management 
WSM managers are held accountable for their 
decisions 
Employees at this company admit their mistakes 
I feel an obligation to challenge poor performance 
by my fellow employees 
My direct supervisor admits his/her mistakes 
Mean 
4.65 
4.64 
4.91 
4.86 
% of employees 
who answered 
(SD) 
agree or 
strongly agree 
1.61 57% 
1.37 60% 
1.54 66% 
1.91 65% 
Though employees rank leaders at an average level of accountability, other 
responses reflect a general trust in all levels of leadership. In most surveyed companies, 
employees trust all levels of leadership about the same, but at WSM there is an even 
greater level of trust for the senior management. At WSM senior management is 
considered the Board of Directors and the General Manager, Ruffin Slater. Scores for 
each of the management categories are at or above average for other employee-owned 
firms (Core Values, 2003). 
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Overall workplace satisfaction at WSM is positive though it does not exceed the 
average of similar companies (Table 4). Employees are generally happy with their 
coworkers, with working conditions and the health and safety of the company. 
Employees also hold above average expectations for the future of the company. Workers 
at WSM strongly agree that the company and its employees are fair and honest. The 
scores of organizational fairness questions rated the company strong on an individual and 
group level. 80 percent of employees agree that company rules and regulations are fair 
(Core Values, 2003). 
Employees at WSM are happier than those at other fim1s with the pay and non-
monetary rewards that they receive at the workplace. Workers feel that they are 
adequately rewarded for the work that they do, especially if they go above and beyond 
what their job entails. More employees at WSM said that their coworkers work hard on a 
regular basis than did employees at other companies (Core Values 2003). This suggests 
that not only do employees find the system fair, but also sufficient to support the work 
process at their cooperative. 
Table 4 
Work Environment 
Item Mean 
Com an rules and re ulations are fair 5.45 
Working conditions at the company are 
health and safe 5.84 
The a s stem at this com an is fair 4.53 
Pea le at WSM work hard 5.92 
I have ood relations with m co-workers 6.15 
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% of employees who 
answered agree or 
SD stron Iv a rec 
1.74 80% 
1.23 87% 
1.86 59% 
1.15 90% 
1.29 92% 
It is relevant to note, that unlike most employee-owned companies, workers at 
WSM ranked financial results of the cooperative as the least important aspect of 
ownership. One of the survey items asked employees to rank the aspects of ownership 
from most to least importance. The average company ranked the items in the following 
order: Fairness, Participation, Community, Financial and Influence. WSM employees 
created this scale: Fairness, Participation, Community, Influence and Financial (Core 
Values, 2003). The results of this ranking system may influence the responses to 
questions about pay and financial reward within the company because workers may be 
less preoccupied with the size of their individual salaries. This may be a reflection of the 
transformational leadership style that permeates throughout the organization. If the firm 
were more traditional and thus transactional, employees would be more concerned with 
individual rewards and increases in pay. 
In general, the descriptive data for WSM suggests a positive vvork environment 
and one that exceeds the measures of other employee owned- companies. One 
weaknesses of the organization seem to be in motivating employees to not only 
understand but act on the values of employee ownership. Employees at this cooperative 
have a solid understanding of what it means to work for a participatory company but they 
need to internalize that meaning in order to help the company function to its greatest 
potential (Table 2). 
Specific Data Analysis 
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The descriptive data from Weaver Street Market suggests a positive work 
environment in which people feel that they have democratic rights. Descriptive data 
however can easily be skewed by any group of people who feel strongly about a 
particular item. Therefore, in order to determine that the work environment is democratic 
and successful for all employees, not just one sub-group, this section explores survey 
responses from specific groups of people. The following research is based on the ordinal 
logistical regressions of four sub-groups: ownership status, tenure, employment status 
and native language. For the purposes of this research only the first three categories 
provide statistically significant regression data. 
In addition to the descriptive data described above, I have made several 
hypotheses about how this data may differ by sub-group. The three sub-groups that I 
have isolated are ownership status, tenure (in years) and job title. When running the 
regressions for each survey item place of work and language were also examined. These 
two variables however, did not relate to the purposes of the overall study and did not 
obviously contribute to changes in the survey results. Because I could not identify a 
specific relationship for either of these variables, I did not make claims about their 
significance in the success of the cooperative. 
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For ownership status the two sub-groups are Owner and Non-Owner. Tenure is 
broken down into .25-1 year, 1-2 years, 3-5 years and 5 or more years. Job title has four 
categories: clerk, lead clerk, specialist and assistant manager. 
In previous chapters I have discussed the need for the working environment to 
improve so that employees have a say in the decision making process of the company, 
feel valued in the workplace and are generally satisfied with their jobs. In this data 
analysis, I hope to find out whether or not these issues are addressed at the cooperative 
and to what extent each sub-group is satisfied with the overall working conditions of 
WSM. To better analyze this data across sub-groups, I ran ordinal regressions on each of 
relevant survey items. I then compared the results of these regressions controlling for 
tenure, job status, ownership status, place of work and English or Spanish speaker to see 
which sub-groups had statistically significant and relevant responses to the question. 
The following are my hypotheses about how the sub-groups of the WSM 
cooperative will respond to certain survey items. 
Hypothesis I: Non-owners will be less concerned with the long-term goals of the 
company and with the group mentality of the cooperative. Owners on the other 
hand are more likely to work hard despite the outcome and are committed to the 
long-term goals of the organization. 
I make this hypothesis because ownership and participation in a firm are meant to 
increase the involvement of workers and therefore it follows that these employees will 
also be more concerned with the direction of the organization. Therefore, I hypothesize 
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that the owners of the company are more likely to work hard despite obvious outcomes or 
rewards and will also show a stronger commitment to the long-term goals of the 
organization. Non-owners on the other hand, will be less concerned \Vith long-term goals 
and more interested in the fairness of day to day practices within the cooperative. 
The first relevant result to report is the fact that in general, owners and non-
owners at WSM answered similarly on almost all survey items. Unlike other ownership 
firms where non-owners feel isolated from the decision-making process and higher 
processes of the firm, non-owner employees at WSM still feel highly connected to the 
company (Executive Summary, 2003). 
Employee-mvners in the cooperative did however, stand out in several categories. 
Based on the descriptive data, owners displayed stronger affiliations than non-owners 
( 4.1) about individual ownership. Similarly in the ordinal regressions, ovmers expected 
their peers to feel more closely associated with the ownership process than non-owners 
(4.2). This is probably because owners have individual connections to the participatory 
process that shapes their view of the company and allows them to project their feelings 
onto their co-workers. Owners also touted a belief in worker-ownership as a successful 
and relevant system while non-owners did not respond strongly either positively or 
negatively. 
Table 4.1 
How important is ownership to you? 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B Robust (SE) regression) 
Owner 1.21 ( .416) .003* 
Clerk .162 (.618) .855 
Lead Clerk -.459 ( .593) .438 
Asst Manager -.77 (.677) .256 
Tenure .162 (.119) .175 
Spanish 1.45 (.585) .013* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=131; pseudo R-squared = .068 
Table 4.2 
How much do others feel like mvners? 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B Robust (SE) regression) 
Owner -1.30 (.408) .001* 
Clerk -.193 (.654) .768 
Lead Clerk .012 (.662) .985 
Asst Manager 1.32 (.606) .029* 
Tenure .068 (.109) .532 
Spanish 1.24 (. 566) .028* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist: 
n=13 l; pseudo R-squared = .0448 
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My hypothesis that non-owners will be less concerned with the long term goals of 
the company and the group mentality of the cooperative can be addressed by approaching 
survey items about contributions to the company's future as ,vell as a willingness to 
improve performance within the workplace. The following survey items are relevant 
here: 
Our company's employees feel that it is important to know how their 
workgroup affects the bottom line 
- Employees at our company are very committed to the company and its future 
People at our company have too little interest in company-wide issues to get 
involved in them 
I feel an obligation to challenge poor performance by my fellow employees 
It's part of my job to find out how my workgroup can improve its 
performance 
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The results of the survey show that in all five of these categories neither owners 
nor non-owners significantly influenced the responses more than other sub-groups. The 
null finding in this section disproves my hypothesis but suggests a stronger \vork 
environment than I had attributed to WSM. The lack of statistically significant responses 
by this sub-group suggests that ownership in the company does not detennine how 
committed the employee will be. The results could also reflect a lack of separation within 
the workplace between owners and non-owners since despite ownership in the company 
many employees are concerned with the direction the organization takes and are willing 
to work together to succeed. 
Hypothesis 2: O\vners and people who have worked for the company for more 
than three years will feel a stronger sense of autonomy within the organization. 
A loss of autonomy or the right to make decisions for oneself in the workplace 
was one of the problems with work that I addressed in the first chapter. In response to 
that problem, I posit that at WSM owners and people who have worked at the cooperative 
for more than three years will have stronger feelings of autonomy within the 
organization. There are three survey items that address autonomy needs: 
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I feel that I am too closely supervised - someone is always checking up on me 
I can make any reasonable changes I need to make in my immediate work 
environment 
People at the company feel that they are too closely supervised 
Ordinal regressions of these three survey items reveal that there was no 
statistically meaningful impact of any employee sub-group. Descriptively, the overall 
means for these items are considered higher than most cooperatives which is a positive 
reflection of the amount of autonomy workers feel at WSM. This data is somewhat 
surprising because typically, employees who work with a company for a long time hold 
higher-level positions. Such positions would afford them more control over their 
workplace and a feeling of superior autonomy. The general responses however, suggest 
that this cooperative differs from traditional businesses in this aspect. At WSM all 
employees share a positive level of autonomy and that no one group feels better or worse 
off than any other in the day to day decision making process at work. 
Hypothesis 3: Management level employees are going to be more supportive of 
cooperative ideals and are more likely to say that the company is successful in 
achieving those ideals. 
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Management level employees within traditional firms have more control over the 
company as a whole and also make more of the long-term business decisions. It is these 
people who are constantly reminded of the mission statement of the organization and who 
try to make it work. The management at WSM plays a very similar role and therefore I 
hypothesize that despite the elected hierarchy, management-level employees are going to 
be more supportive of cooperative ideals as a group. Management will also have a more 
positive impression of the company than other workers and will state that the company is 
successful in achieving cooperative ideals. 
The following survey items are meant to reflect the worker's general feelings 
about the cooperative model and the success of that model at WSM. 
Cooperative Model 
Employees believe in the benefit of worker ownership (no) 
The company must take risks in order to prosper 
Employee Owners deserve a say over how the company is run 
WSMModcl 
Employees have real influence over the direction of the company 
The company responds to employee suggestions 
My point of view is taken into consideration about the general direction of the 
company 
The company makes a sincere effort to share information with employees 
The company encourages people to participate in decisions that affect their 
day-to-day work 
Overall the company is fair to its employees 
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The pay system is fair 
Assistant Managers, the highest-level employees in the sub-group, affected this data set 
more than any other sub group in this category. On these particular items, assistant 
managers showed a statistically significant response to all but three of the questions. The 
Assistant Manager status did not affect the employees belief of worker ownership, 
whether worker-owners deserve a say in the company or in the statement "the company 
encourages people to participate." Several regressions are noted below, for complete 
regression tables see Appendix A. 
Table 4.3 
Employee owners deserve a say over how the company is run 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner .685 (.442) .121 
Clerk -.530 (.928) .568 
Lead Clerk -.409 (.897) .648 
Asst Manager -1.54 (. 861) .072 
Tenure -.076 (.112) .497 
Spanish -1.05 (.480) .028* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=13 l; pseudo R-squared = .0495 
Table 4.4 
The company must take risks in order to prosper 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner -.059 (.395) .881 
Clerk .664 {.586) .277 
Lead Clerk .314 (.578) .593 
Asst ManaQer 1.71 (.715) .019* 
Tenure .107 (.115) .403 
Spanish 1.04 (.526) .117 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=l 31, pseudo R-squared = .0575 
Table 4.5 
The company rarely responds to employee suggestions 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner .439 (.357) .219 
Clerk -.034 (.573) .952 
Lead Clerk .175 (.555) .752 
Asst ManaQer -1.73 (.520) .001* 
Tenure .170 (.097) .081 
Spanish 1.43 (.517) .006* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n==131; pseudo R-squared == .0694 
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The remaining seven survey items all showed a statistically significant response 
from assistant managers. These results suggest that the assistant managers have more 
confidence and belief in the company than other employees. It could be said that these 
responses are influential because the assistant managers have more information about the 
inner-workings of the organization. Another survey item asked whether employees felt 
that they had all of the information that they needed about the company and again, 
assistant managers provided the only statistically significant response. Despite the 
statistically significant response by assistant managers, the mean WSM employee 
response on this item was stronger than at most employee-owned companies. 
I hypothesize that the assistant manager's answers are significant in so many 
categories because they are the people\who not only believe in the ideas of the 
cooperative but have internalized them. It is more likely that the management discusses 
ownership ideals frequently and that participation in company issues is part of their 
weekly job. Clerks, lead clerks, and specialists on the other hand may only think about 
cooperative issues at the monthly participation meetings. The fact that management did 
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not show outstanding results in two of the categories suggests that all employees still care 
about the cooperative model but may not be immersed in the nuances of it every day. 
Hypothesis 4: In general people will be satisfied. with their workplace across sub-
groups because the cooperative idea provides a good working environment. 
Employees with less than three years experience or who are not owners may be 
more dissatisfied. Management will be more satisfied than other groups because 
they will have the most freedom in how they do their job. 
Unlike many traditional finns where some employees, particularly management, 
are happy and satisfied in their jobs while others are miserable, I hypothesize that 
workers at WSM will not be sharply divided on their satisfaction with the workplace. I 
argue that satisfaction with the work environment may actually grow over time and the 
only significant data may be a result of tenure with the company. In this case, it is the 
lack of statistically significant data that I argue points to the positive and equitable 
environment at Weaver Street. The following are relevant survey items: 
Working conditions at the company are healthy and safe 
Employees are satisfied working for this company 
I have good relations with my co-\vorkers 
I have higher expectations for WSM than I would for most companies 
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Regression results for all four of these items show that the only sub-group ,vith a 
statistically significant response is the influence of tenure on the health and safety of 
working conditions. People who have worked at the cooperative longer consider it less 
safe and healthy than those who have worked there for 1-2 years. The other three items 
show no relevant responses by any sub-group suggesting that answers ranged equally 
among employees. The descriptive data for these specific items shows average responses 
in comparison to other employee-owned companies and an overall positive rating of the 
WSM work environment. 
Table 4.6 
Working conditions at the company arc healthy and safe 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) remession) 
Owner -.375 (.530) .480 
Clerk .580 (.706) .411 
Lead Clerk .220 (.626) .725 
Asst Manager .656 (.565) .246 
Tenure -.217 (.114) .057 
Spanish 1.44 (.738) .050* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist: 
n=l 31; pseudo R-squared = .0924 
Hypothesis 5: Leadership in the organization will be seen as reasonably fair and 
successful by all levels and tenure of employees because the elected hierarchy 
allows workers some say over who they report to. 
Based on the qualitative responses from Weaver Street employees about the 
leadership structure at the organization, I hypothesize that leadership responses in the 
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survey will be seen as fair and successful by all levels and tenure of employees. This 
hypothesis is also supported by the concept of an elected hierarchy in which employees 
have a choice in who supervises them and are thus more likely to accept their leadership. 
Leadership data comes from the following survey items: 
Overall this company is fair to its employees 
The person I report to is fair to me 
WSM managers are held responsible for their decisions 
My direct supervisor admits his or her mistakes 
Employees at WSM trust their department managers 
Employees at WSM trust their store manager 
Employees at WSM trust the general manager and administrative managers 
Of the seven items listed above, four showed no statistically significant variations 
by sub-group while three were affected by the answers of assistant managers. Assistant 
managers significantly answered that the company is fair to employees, that managers are 
held responsible for their decisions and that employees trust store managers. The other 
four items remained consistent across sub-groups and the descriptive data suggests 
positive responses to each leadership category. As mentioned in the descriptive data 
section above, the ratings of trust in the general manager and administrative managers 
were particularly high. 
Table 4.7 
Overall the company is fair to employees 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner -.100 (.419) .810 
Clerk -.314 (.648) .628 
Lead Clerk -.254 (.535) .635 
Asst Manager 1.33 (.536) .013* 
Tenure -.061 (.111) .577 
Spanish .974 (.556) .080 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=131; pseudo R-squared = .0365 
Table 4.8 
\VSM managers are held responsible for their decisions 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner -.337 (.435) .438 
Clerk -.538 (.619) .385 
Lead Clerk -.032 (.634) .960 
Asst Manager 1.15 (.581) .047* 
Tenure -.115 (.096) .235 
Spanish 2.23 (.555) .000* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=l3 l; pseudo R-squared = .0630 
Table 4.9 
Employees at WSM trust their store manager 
P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) re~ression) 
Owner -.188 (.423) .656 
Clerk .414 (.514) .373 
Lead Clerk .440 (.590) .451 
Asst Manager 1.09 (.397) .014* 
Tenure .000 (.917) .895 
Spanish 2.19 (.567) .000* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=l 31; pseudo R-squared = .0659 
The regression responses in this section are pertinent not only to the success of 
WSM but to my theses about the necessity of strong and accepted leadership within a 
cooperative organization. The presence of strong assistant manger responses suggests 
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that more work could be done within the organization to make sure that leadership 
acceptance and confidence is felt at all levels of employment. The descriptive data shows 
that the leadership is never rejected or fully disproved of but that there could be a 
stronger show of support from clerks and lead clerks. On a day to day basis however, the 
responses to leadership support, both descriptive and regressional are extremely positive 
forWSM. 
Hypothesis 6: Positive responses to questions about community, change within 
the organization, supportive and involved supervisors and employee recognition 
will be seen in all sub-groups and will suggest a transfonnational leadership style 
within the organization. 
My final hypothesis revolves around the idea of transfonnational leadership at 
WSM. Drawing on my qualitative research, I argue that transfonnational leadership is 
present at WSM even if it is not recognized as such. I also think that the transformational 
leadership style is the most successful way to create a strong and lasting cooperative 
environment. In this hypothesis WSM employees will have positive responses to 
questions about organizational community, adaptability of the company, supportive 
supervisors and employee recognition. Each of the following items is related to an aspect 
of transformational leadership as discussed in Chapter 3. In order to suggest that 
transformational leadership does exist within this organization, I will need to see a 
positive response in at least six of the eight items below. 
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o/o of employees who 
answered agree or 
Item strongly agree 
At this company, people avoid new ideas; they do things 
the way they have always been done 25% 
This company gives appropriate recognition to 
employees who make extraordinary contributions 60% 
No matter how they perform, people at this company 
expect the same rewards as everyone else 34% 
The person I report to actively seeks my input 69% 
I get sufficient feedback about my work to improve my 
performance 70% 
My direct supervisor admits his/her mistakes 65% 
The person I report to is fair to me 83% 
It is possible for things to change here 80% 
All of the above items received an average or stronger than average response 
at WSM. The regression statistics for these items also suggests that no sub-group 
influences the data in one-way or another. Therefore, these are items that employees feel 
similarly about regardless of job title or tenure/ WSM was stronger than other employee-
owned companies on the willingness to hear nev,, ideas, accepting the same rewards and 
giving employees the recognition they deserve. The descriptive data for these items 
suggests that at least forty percent of employees feel that the issues discussed are strongly 
or very strongly represented within their organization. 
With regards to transformational leadership, this data is extremely positive. It 
suggests that all of the above items which are linked to the transformational leadership 
style exist within the WSM firm. Not only are these items noticed by employees, but 
they are also seen as a strong and positive part of the cooperative community. 
Summary Points from Data Analysis 
• There is general satisfaction with the work environment, the cooperative model 
and leadership at WSM. 
• WSM had a weaker response to relinquishing control than other ESOPs 
• WSM has a weaker response to internalization of cooperative ideals than other 
ESOPs 
• Owners feel more strongly than non-owners about individual ownership 
• Owners and non-owners feel similarly about commitment to the company and 
participation in the firm 
• All sub-groups felt relatively autonomous 
• Assistant managers felt more strongly about cooperative ideals than other sub-
groups 
• All sub-groups displayed similar satisfaction with their daily jobs 
• All sub-groups displayed similar satisfaction with WSM leadership 
• Survey responses suggest that transfonnational leadership exists at WSM 
Data Conclusions 
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The descriptive and regression data from the NCEO survey taken by Weaver 
Street Market employees highlights some positive and negative aspects of the 
organization. First, WSM, like many cooperatives, is still struggling with how to have 
employees not only understand what it means to have rights in a cooperative but also how 
to take responsibility for those rights. The employees at WSM generally understand the 
cooperative model and are satisfied with their workplace. However, they have not fully 
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internalized the ideals of the cooperative to the point of self-sacrifice. _Many of the 
employees at WSM want to use all of their rights all the time, even when it is not in the 
best interest of the company. This response by employees could be typical of a 
cooperative environment where people are given freedom and equality in the workplace. 
The apparent disconnect between responsibility and action may not be a disconnect at all, 
but rather a sign of the employees thinking for themselves and working on their own 
terms. In order to further understand this relationship and whether or not it is a problem, 
further research is necessary. 
Workers at WSM are typically happy with their jobs, the pay and the day to day 
activities that occur there. Though I cannot compare these data to those of a traditionally 
organized company, the satisfaction rating seems reflective of a functional and successful 
workplace. Very few workers at the organization expressed extreme dissatisfaction with 
their positions or the community in which they work. 
WSM is also successful at creating a cooperative environment in which owners 
and non-owners feel like a part of the organization. The data suggests a great equality 
within the workplace because regardless of ovmership status or job title -- specifically 
among clerks, lead clerks and specialists -- survey responses were very similar. Though 
the assistant managers provided many statistically significant regression responses, they 
are the only group that is outstanding. WSM could improve on this by making sure that 
workers who are not managers have the same understanding and appreciation of 
cooperative ideals as managers. However, I note that not all employees are going to be 
interested in knowing every detail of the cooperative and that perhaps at WSM, the 
employees who do care and want to be extremely involved are in management positions. 
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Worker-ownership is about making choices first and foremost, and if an employee cannot 
choose just to do his or her job and vote several times a year, then the purpose of the 
organization is not being served. 
The leadership style at WSM is extremely successful and is appreciated and 
respected by all employees in spite of sub-groups. Not only do employees trust their 
leaders but they are also satisfied with the way they are treated and the information that 
they receive from these people. Transformational leadership is also apparent in the 
cooperative model at Weaver Street. Leaders solicit information from their followers, 
create a sense of community, give feedback and are fair. Workers also have a sense of 
what it means to belong to a cooperative and feel that they have adequate information 
about the overall goals of the organization. The combination of these leadership 
techniques and the education of employees suggest a strong transformational structure 
that has allowed the organization to prosper. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis explores the potential of worker ovmership and examines the 
leadership structures within participatory finns. The guiding issue for my research is the 
marginalization of employees and a lack of democracy in the workplace. In an attempt to 
understand how democracy could be brought to employees I explore the cooperative 
business model and ask questions about how to improve the general and leadership 
structures within these organizations. From my research of these issues, I draw several 
conclusions about the cooperative business sector and what can make it more 
democratically and economically successful in the future. 
Cooperative businesses can be successful economically but they must be willing 
to combine traditional business methods with nev,1 rules and leadership styles. First, I 
must define success in both economic and democratic terms as it applies to a cooperative. 
I define an economically successful cooperative as one that is competitive in the larger 
capitalist market. Many cooperatives find their niche on a local rather than a national 
scale, but if they are able to compete and profit within that market, then I consider them 
successful economically. Democratic success can only be determined by feedback 
surveys similar to the one I analyzed for Weaver Street Market. Because democracy 
within the firm is rooted in the employees, I consider a cooperative democratically 
successful if its employees feel that they have democratic rights, participation and 
influence within the organization. 
After researching Mondragon, the Plywood Cooperatives and Weaver Street 
Market, I argue that cooperatives can be economically successful in a variety of markets, 
locations and service areas. That success, though diverse, is also based on the balance of 
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traditional business practices with innovative ideas and transformational leadership. In 
my research, I observed that cooperatives were not successful when they denied all 
traditional practices such as a hierarchical structure, restricted freedom and rewards-
based systems. Though these practices have had negative impact on some employees, I 
believe that some structure and restriction is necessary for economic success. 
Leadership in organizations can be executed in a variety of styles. In the 
cooperative setting it is necessary to first create a leadership structure that can be 
referenced by future employees. To create the highest level of stability and facilitate 
worker participation, this structure should reinforce the vision of the organization and the 
role that each worker has in fulfilling the vision. The structure should then advise 
workers and leaders on how to balance the task-oriented necessities of the business world 
with the vision and purpose of the organization. As seen in both Mondragon and the 
Plywood cooperatives it is often hard to balance ideals with functionality. This 
leadership structure should then be presented to every employee of the company, not just 
the hired or elected managers. If the workers understand and participate in the leadership 
of the organization, they may be more accepting of each individual leader. 
Specifically, I think that in order to succeed, there needs to be some sort or power 
structure within the organization. Hierarchical structures can be one of the most 
damaging aspects of a traditional business, but if people are elected into that structure or 
it is in some way created by the employees, it is less damaging. People respond and 
understand hierarchical structures because they exist in every facet of society. If these 
structures are used positively to create a functional system that employees can understand 
without devaluing them, then they can greatly contribute to the success of the 
organization. 
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This hierarchical structure must also incorporate the transformational leadership 
style if it is going to encourage democratic success within the organization. The 
existence of an elected hierarchy is not enough to guarantee democratic participation 
within the organization. Rather, the transfomrntional leadership style, one in which 
success is not reward-based and employees are inspired to work as a group towards a 
higher vision, must be advocated by all levels of management. 
Typically, hierarchical structures are paired with transactional leadership. The 
leader rewards his employees and they work for those rewards with the hope of moving 
up in the hierarchy. At a cooperative finn, this system will not lead to democratic 
success for several reasons. First, the hierarchy is elected so working for a promotion 
given by a leader is not possible. Also, cooperative and democratic environments require 
a commitment to ideals and a system beyond day to day involvement. Leaders who 
operate in a transactional mode do not emphasize working towards a vision or a company 
ideal. 
Transformational leadership will complement the hierarchical systems that may 
be in place within a cooperative because it will also aid in spreading the ideals of 
participatory ownership. The cooperatives discussed in this thesis demonstrated that 
participation does exist in each of their organizations. Hoivever, in the Weaver Street 
case study, it was shown that the management felt more connected to participation within 
the company than other employees. In order to improve overall democratic success 
within cooperatives, more employees need to feel connected to the participation process. 
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Transformational leadership can help this occur in these organizations by teaching 
and encouraging participation through trickle-down practices. Because transfonnational 
leadership is meant to encourage close relationships between management and 
employees, the management can use these relationships to teach the value of participation 
and to give responses and feedback to employees. Employees are more likely to feel that 
they have a real role and impact on the company if the management or the Board of 
Directors is responding to them. Direct and open relationships of this sort also increase 
the likelihood that employees will feel valued in the workplace. This sense of value or 
connection to the organization may have positive economic benefits in long run because 
employees are more committed to the company. 
At WSM and potentially at other cooperatives, employees understand what it 
means to participate. They understand the basic concepts, the goals and the purpose of 
participation, but they have yet to internalize its meaning. Workers are not yet used to 
the idea of sacrificing for the company as a whole nor are they willing to give up personal 
choice even when someone else has more expertise on a subject. Now that employees do 
have the right to participate, cooperatives need to help them internalize and act on that 
right. 
There are, however, limitations to the internalization of such ideals. It is possible 
that cooperatives in America draw in a more educated workforce because such people are 
interested in and have access to information about a democratic workplace. Teaching and 
explaining the internalization of cooperative processes to college-educated employees is 
easier than teaching it to workers without a high school education. Another limitation is 
the likelihood that some people don't have any desire to take part in the democratic 
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processes of their workplace. Perhaps there is no need for them to internalize cooperative 
ideals but rather just to have an understanding of them for the benefit of their daily job. 
Despite these limitations, it is important to keep teaching the cooperative process, 
its day to day requirements and the internalization of its ideals to all employees within the 
organization. It may be harder for some people to understand than others and 
cooperatives may at first draw in only certain types of people, but if they arc able to 
create a strong base within the capitalist market, then they will be opening up valuable 
and democratic job opportunities over time. The success of the cooperative model could 
also inspire the creation of more democratic firms, in turn expanding the scope of the 
cooperative organization and allowing people of different educational, geographic and 
ethnic backgrounds to find employment in a democratic environment. 
After exploring worker participation as a solution to workplace problems such as 
personal devaluation and leadership coercion, I conclude that the cooperative business 
model can offer a positive, democratic environment for employees. If the cooperative 
structure is organized in a way that combines elements of traditional business with more 
democratic methods, the cooperative can succeed both economically and democratically. 
Transformational leadership is a key element in cooperative success because it creates a 
workforce striving for one vision in a place where they feel their opinions are valued. 
Though cooperatives may currently be more accessible to educated workers and may be 
more attractive to people with certain political ideals, the success of such organizations 
will hopefully expand the democratic business sector so that more people can and will 
become involved. 
Appendix A 
Ordinal logistic regressions from NCEO survey of WSM employees 
In these ordinal logistic regressions. the workplace site is also controlled 
but is not included in the tables. 
Table A.I 
The company encourages people to participate 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner .536 (.435) .218 
Clerk .366 {.610) .549 
Lead Clerk -.522 (.691) .450 
Asst Manaaer .468 (.561) .404 
Tenure -.101 (.115) .381 
Spanish -.748 (.524) .154 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=131; pseudo R-squared = .0313 
Table A.2 
Employees have real influence over the direction of the company 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner -.237 (.459) .605 
Clerk .484 (.686) .481 
Lead Clerk .132 (.644) .837 
Asst Manager .449 (.585) .443 
Tenure .049 (.120) .683 
Spanish 2.05 (.553) .000* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n= 131; pseudo R-squared = .03 7 6 
Table A.3 
Employees believe in the benefit of worker ownership 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner -.874 (.425) .040* 
Clerk .717 (.517) .165 
Lead Clerk .717 (.642) .264 
Asst Manager .306 (.508) .547 
Tenure .034 (.116) .764 
Spanish 1.13 (.557) .042* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=131; pseudo R-squared = .0263 
Table A.4 
The pay system is fair 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner (.453) .561 
Clerk -.551 (.581) .343 
Lead Clerk -.633 (.534) .384 
Asst Manaqer .562 (.529) .979 
Tenure -.092 (.099) .355 
Spanish -.216 (.658) .743 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=131; pseudo R-squared = .0392 
Table A.5 
My point of view is taken into account 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner -.599 (.405) .139 
Clerk .208 (.488) .669 
Lead Clerk -.431 (.473) .362 
Asst Manaqer 1.38 (.535) .010* 
Tenure .090 (.099) .362 
Spanish 1.15 (.515) .025* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=l31; pseudo R-squared = .0546 
Table A.6 
The company makes a sincere effort to share information with employees 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner -.576 ( .443) .193 
Clerk .466 (.648) .472 
Lead Clerk -.278 (.676) .681 
Asst Manager 1.75 (.484) .000* 
Tenure -.069 (.102) .494 
Spanish 1.50 (.522) .004* 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=l31; pseudo R-squared = .0747 
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TableA.7 
Overall the company is fair to its employees 
Independent P > lzl (significant 
Variable B (SE) regression) 
Owner -.100 (.419) .810 
Clerk -.314 (.648) .628 
Lead Clerk -.254 (.535) .635 
Asst Manager 1.33 (.536) .013* 
Tenure -.061 (.111) .577 
Spanish .974 (.556) .080 
Ordinal Regression model. Omitted dummy variable: Specialist; 
n=131; pseudo R-squared = .0365 
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Appendix B 
Summary Data for all Independent Variables 
Independent Variables 
Independent Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variable 
Own 121 .512 .501 0 1 
T enureyears 121 2.46 2.09 .5 6 
Specialist 117 .145 .353 0 1 
Clerk 117 .384 .488 0 1 
Asstman 117 .205 .405 0 1 
Leadclerk 117 .264 .443 0 1 
Spanish 123 .195 .397 0 1 
Carrboro 120 .666 .473 0 1 
Panzanel 120 .133 .341 0 1 
S village2 120 .108 .312 0 1 
WSM 128 .101 .303 0 1 
Admin 
Appendix C 
Summary data: 
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WSM responses are stronger than other ESOPs on these items 
Data table from NCEO Executive Summary Report, WSM 2003 
Survey Items WSM Versus Item Category 
Average ocs 
Average 
Some people in this company get 4.2 +.9 Organizational 
undeserved special treatment Fairness 
At this company there are adequate 5.5 +.9 Information and 
opportunities for employees to learn Learning 
about business 
How much do you feel like an 5.7 +.9 Ovmership Identity 
owner of this company? 
How much do other employees feel 5.9 +.8 Ownership Identity 
like owners of this company? 
My pay is about what it should be 4.1 +.7 Work and Pay 
People at WSM are given enough 4.8 +.7 Infom1ation and 
information to do their jobs well Learning 
This company gives appropriate 4.7 +.6 Work and Pay 
recognition to employees who make 
extraordinary contributions 
Employees at WSM trust the GM 5.1 +.6 Trust in Leadership 
and administrative managers 
I get sufficient feedback about my 5.0 +.6 Information and 
work to improve my performance Leaming 
Generally speaking, I understand the 5.5 +.6 Ownership Identity 
cooperative ownership idea and how it 
works at this company. 
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